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Aging Judges 
FRANCIS X. SHEN* 
America’s judiciary is aging. The average age of federal judges is sixty-
nine years old, older than it has been at any other time in the country’s 
history. The typical reaction to this demographic shift is concern that 
aging judges will serve past their prime. Scholars have thus offered 
proposals for mandatory judicial retirement, judicial term limits, and 
mechanisms for judicial removal. In this Article, I critique such 
proposals and draw on cognitive neuroscience to argue that rather than 
forcing their retirement, we should empower aging judges.  
 
The central neuroscientific insight is that individual brains age 
differently. While at the population level, age generally leads to 
reductions in information processing speed, and for some, serious 
deficits in memory and decision-making capacity, there is much 
individual variation.  
 
Given individual differences in how aging affects cognitive decline, the 
current system—which mandates intense health scrutiny when a judge 
is younger, followed by no formal cognitive evaluation for the rest of 
the judge’s career—can be improved. I argue that we can empower 
judges by providing them opportunities for confidential, accurate, and 
thorough cognitive assessments at regular intervals throughout their 
judicial careers. 
 
If carefully developed and implemented so as to avoid politicization and 
to ensure complete confidentiality of results, individualized judicial 
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cognitive health assessments will allow judges to make more informed 
decisions about when and how to modify their service on the bench. 
More individualized assessment will allow the legal system to retain the 
wisdom of experienced judges, while avoiding the injustice that comes 
with handing over the courtroom to a judge who is no longer capable 
of running it. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The people . . . have a legitimate, indeed compelling, interest in 
maintaining a judiciary fully capable of performing the demanding 
tasks that judges must perform. It is an unfortunate fact of life that 
physical and mental capacity sometimes diminish with age. The people 
may therefore wish to replace some older judges. Voluntary retirement 
will not always be sufficient.  
–Justice Sandra Day O’Connor1 
 
The average age of America’s federal judges is sixty-nine years old—older 
than it has been at any other time in the country’s history.2 On the United States 
Supreme Court, in addition to Justice Ginsburg, who is eighty-six years old, 
Stephen Breyer is eighty-one, and Clarence Thomas is seventy-one.3 In the 
lower courts, there are eleven federal judges over the age of ninety who still hear 
cases.4 Concerns about aging judges have reignited the long-running interest in 
implementing term limits, mandatory retirement ages, and forced removal for 
federal judges.5 
                                                                                                                     
 1 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 472 (1991) (citations omitted).  
 2 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 3 Current Members, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biograph 
ies.aspx [https://perma.cc/UK9X-WDJ8]. 
 4 Life Tenure for Federal Judges Raises Issues of Senility, Dementia, PROPUBLICA 
(Jan. 18, 2011), https://www.propublica.org/article/life-tenure-for-federal-judges-raises-
issues-of-senility-dementia [https://perma.cc/7KP8-7WVC] [hereinafter Life Tenure for 
Federal Judges]. 
 5 Compare Daniel Hemel, What Happens if Ruth Bader Ginsburg Remains Too 
Sick to Work?, POLITICO MAG. (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/ 
story/2019/01/16/ruth-bader-ginsburg-supreme-court-health-224014 [https://perma.cc 
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In this Article, I critique such proposals and draw on cognitive neuroscience 
to argue that rather than forcing them to retire, we should empower aging judges. 
The key innovation I propose is individualized, brain-based assessment of 
legally relevant cognitive functioning. Drawing on recent advances in the 
detection of dementia, I propose in this Article a new path forward that mandates 
(1) the development of a judicial cognitive assessment tool; and (2) confidential, 
individualized cognitive assessment using the tool for all judges at least every 
five years. The results of the assessment would remain confidential to the judge, 
and the proposal would not introduce mandatory retirement, term limits, or new 
protocols for removing judges. Rather, the system is premised on empowering 
judges with better data to inform their personal, private decisions about when 
and how to modify their judicial workloads. 
The Article also turns its attention to aging judges in state judiciaries. A 
majority of states employ a mandatory judicial retirement age, but several states 
have raised the retirement age in recent years.6 In upholding state mandatory 
retirement ages for judges, Justice O’Connor wrote, “It is an unfortunate fact of 
life that physical and mental capacity sometimes diminish with age.”7 At the 
population level, age generally leads to reductions in information processing 
speed, and for some, serious deficits in memory and decision-making capacity.8 
But there is much individual variation. While an eighty-year-old judge is at 
significantly greater risk for dementia than a fifty-year-old judge, it does not 
follow that all eighty-year-old judges have diminished cognitive capacities, nor 
that all fifty-year-old judges are free from dementia. Mandatory retirement 
regimes conflate age with diminished judicial capacity, overlooking the wisdom 
that comes with experience and the scientific reality that age is a risk factor for, 
but not dispositive of, cognitive decline. 
At present, neither the federal nor state judicial systems formally provide 
judges with regular opportunities to assess their cognitive health. The lack of 
cognitive health assessments for older judges is striking when contrasted with 
the data requested of younger judges during the nomination process. The 
judicial nomination process is the one time in a judge’s career when judges are 
routinely required to undergo a cognitive health examination.  
The United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary requires that 
nominees undergo a medical exam,9 and the medical form provided to nominees 
includes several items directly related to brain health. There is a long list of 
conditions that may be disqualifying, and they include “progressive 
                                                                                                                     
/AW88-AUN6] (arguing that allowing justices to serve for life is better than other 
alternatives), with Eric Segall, Why Professor Hemel Is Wrong About Life Tenure for 
SCOTUS, DORF L. (Jan. 16, 2019), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2019/01/why-professor-
hemel-is-wrong-about-life.html [https://perma.cc/P2GD-A2PW] (supporting term limits 
and mandatory retirement ages).  
 6 See discussion infra Part V. 
 7 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 472 (1991) (emphasis added). 
 8 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 9 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PHYSICAL QUALIFICATION—JUDICIARY [on file with author]. 
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neurological disorders,” “current emotional or mental instability,” and “any 
other condition that is disabling or potentially disabling in the foreseeable 
future.”10 Later in the form, the medical provider is instructed to check either 
“Yes” or “No” in answer to the question: “Do you find any abnormal condition 
or disease of . . . [the] Brain & Nervous System?”11 
If the judicial nominee clears the health exam and the broader nomination 
process, the judge will join the bench, enjoy life tenure, and never again be 
required to undergo a brain health checkup.12 The current system—which 
mandates intense scrutiny when a judge is younger, followed by zero required 
follow-up as a judge ages—can be improved. 
Specifically, I propose a judicial cognitive health assessment program that: 
(1) mandates and funds the collection of baseline neuroimaging and 
neuropsychology data at the nomination stage, and follow-up neuroimaging and 
neuropsychology data in regular five-year intervals thereafter; and (2) requires 
that the results of the testing remain fully confidential and private, with no 
exceptions. 
While the judge’s physician may make recommendations about disclosure, 
in my proposed system the judge will retain power over their brain data. This is 
important because it empowers judges, is less likely to become politicized, and 
can be administered outside of media scrutiny.  
As described in Part II, my proposal harnesses the promise, while navigating 
the perils, of recent advances in dementia biomarkers. In the past two decades, 
there have been “revolutionary changes in dementia research and practice, with 
a growing array of imaging and fluid biomarkers taking center stage in 
diagnostic evaluation and monitoring of progression.”13 Appropriate use of 
these biomarkers would allow the system to more effectively identify and 
anticipate judicial cognitive decline.  
The Article is organized into seven parts. Part I provides context by 
discussing the aging of the federal judiciary. Part II reviews the science of age-
related cognitive decline. It should be noted at the outset that “dementia” is an 
umbrella term to capture multiple neurodegenerative diseases, including but not 
limited to Alzheimer’s disease (AD).14 I primarily focus on AD in this Article 
                                                                                                                     
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 See infra Part II.B. 
 13 Bradford C. Dickerson, Neuroimaging, Cerebrospinal Fluid Markers, and Genetic 
Testing in Dementia, in DEMENTIA: COMPREHENSIVE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 528, 531 
(Bradford C. Dickerson & Alireza Atri eds., 2014); see also David S. Knopman et al., The 
National Institute on Aging and the Alzheimer’s Association Research Framework for 
Alzheimer’s Disease: Perspectives from the Research Roundtable, 14 ALZHEIMER’S & 
DEMENTIA 563, 564 (2018) (discussing the development and importance of enhanced 
biomarkers). 
 14 ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N, UNDERSTANDING ALZHEIMER’S AND DEMENTIA 2 (July 2019), 
https://www.alz.org/media/Documents/understanding-alzheimers-dementia-b.pdf [https 
://perma.cc/7PXB-QPST] (explaining that primary causes of dementia include Alzheimer’s 
Disease, Vascular Dementia, Dementia with Lewy Bodies, and Frontotemporal Dementia). 
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for illustrative purposes, but the proposed judicial cognitive health evaluation 
would screen for many types of dementia. 
Part III explores the formal and informal mechanisms by which the federal 
system identifies and responds to judges experiencing cognitive decline. Formal 
mechanisms of redress are rarely used, leaving informal mechanisms as the 
primary strategy for addressing judicial cognitive decline. I argue that the 
“honor system” has largely worked well but could function even better with the 
addition of individualized assessment data.  
Part IV reviews the states’ use of mandatory judicial retirement ages, 
currently the most widely adopted solution to address the challenge of aging 
judges. Given individual variation in how brains age, I argue that mandatory 
retirement is an inefficient and constitutionally suspect response to age-related 
judicial cognitive decline. 
Having described and critiqued the existing federal and state strategies to 
address judicial cognitive decline, Part V proposes the introduction of 
individualized judicial cognitive assessments, including baseline and follow-up 
neurological and neurocognitive testing. In establishing the core cognitive 
competencies required to carry out judicial duties, the proposal draws on judicial 
canons of conduct, as well as existing state and federal health questionnaires for 
judicial nominees. Because my proposed solution involves the collection of 
baseline and follow-up brain biomarker data, I address concerns specific to brain 
data. Part VI discusses several possible implications of, and extensions to, the 
proposed system. I discuss constitutionality, feasibility, and legitimacy. Part VII 
concludes. 
II. AMERICA’S AGING JUDICIARY 
This Part briefly explores the reasons why America’s judiciary is getting 
older. Part A utilizes data from the Federal Judicial Center to discuss how the 
average age of judges in the federal system has increased over time. Part B 
discusses the availability of “senior status” for federal judges and judges’ 
general hesitance to fully retire. Part C presents the available data on ages of 
state judges and discusses recent trends to raise the mandatory retirement age in 
several states. 
A. Federal Judges Are Getting Older 
The ability to extend life has led to a greater number and a greater proportion 
of older adults in the United States. Based on census data, it is estimated that by 
“2050, the population aged 65 and over is projected to be 83.7 million, almost 
double its estimated population of 43.1 million in 2012.”15 The economic, 
                                                                                                                     
 15 JENNIFER M. ORTMAN ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AN AGING NATION: THE OLDER 
POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (May 2014), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/ 
Census/library/publications/2014/demo/p25-1140.pdf [https://perma.cc/962U-BL8G]. 
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political, and social implications of these demographic trends have been the 
subject of much analysis.16 
In line with these broader demographic trends, the federal judiciary is also 
getting older. Data from the Federal Judicial Center shows a steady increase in 
judicial age.17 Today, the average age of Article III judges is sixty-nine years 
old, the highest it has ever been.18 
B. Life Tenure, Senior Status, and Retirement 
The aging judiciary is, in part, the result of medical advances that allow 
humans to live longer. But longer lifespans are only an enabling condition; in 
many sectors, the aging population has not altered the average age of the 
workers. For instance, in professional football, the average age is falling, as is 
the average length of an NFL career.19 This is because NFL football players do 
not enjoy job security and are readily replaced by younger players.20 
To take another example from a different industry, there has not been a large 
increase in the percentage of older truck drivers, even though there are no 
mandatory retirement ages for truckers.21 The lack of older truck drivers is not 
                                                                                                                     
 16 See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, AGING AND THE MACROECONOMY: LONG-
TERM IMPLICATIONS OF AN OLDER POPULATION (2012) (exploring the relationship between 
economics and an increasing population of aging adults); SUSAN M. HILLIER & GEORGIA M. 
BARROW, AGING, THE INDIVIDUAL, AND SOCIETY (9th ed. 2011); (explaining many social 
aspects of the aging process); James M. Poterba, Retirement Security in an Aging Population, 
104 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (2014) (discussing economics and retirement security for an 
increasing population of aging adults); GRAYSON K. VINCENT & VICTORIA A. VELKOFF, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, THE NEXT FOUR DECADES: THE OLDER POPULATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: 2010 TO 2050 (May 2010), https://census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/public 
ations/2010/demo/p25-1138.pdf [https://perma.cc/JXE4-TWL7] (predicting shifts in the 
population and demographics of aging adults). 
 17 Demography of Article III Judges, 1789–2017, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc 
.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/age-and-experience-judges [https://perma.cc/ 
9ASS-MRL3]. Over the span of 1790–2017, the average age has risen from forty-nine to 
sixty-nine. Id. As discussed in the text, this increase in average age is also due, in part, to the 
ability of judges to take senior status while still regularly hearing cases. Id.  
 18 Id. It should be noted that while average age is rising, the age at appointment has 
slightly decreased over the last half-century. Albert Yoon, Federal Judicial Tenure, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 70, 71 (Lee Epstein & Stefanie A. 
Lindquist eds., 2017) (“[T]he average age at commission has declined, albeit modestly, from 
the Truman to Obama administrations.”). 
 19 Kevin Clark, The NFL Has an Age Problem, RINGER (Sept. 7, 2016), 
https://www.theringer.com/2016/9/7/16077250/the-nfl-has-an-age-problem-7068825845e4 
[https://perma.cc/47N3-CTWZ]. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Todd Dills, Shifting Age Demographics Among Truck Drivers Could Exacerbate 
Driver Shortage over Next 10 Years, COM. CARRIER J. (Feb. 17, 2015), https://www.ccj 
digital.com/shifting-age-demographics-among-truck-drivers-could-exacerbate-driver 
-shortage-over-next-10-years/ [https://perma.cc/JG6K-6976]. 
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because younger truck drivers are pushing them out,22 but rather because most 
older truck drivers follow the pattern of older workers generally—they retire. 
Although there is variation by education level, the average retirement age for 
Americans is sixty-four for men and sixty-two for women.23 
It is worth reflecting on this comparison for a moment. The average 
retirement age for most Americans is between sixty-two and sixty-four years 
old. The average age of Article III judges is sixty-nine.24 Clearly, federal judges 
prefer to keep working than to retire.25  
This preference was enabled by the advent of “senior status.”26 In 1919, 
Congress “created the office of Senior Judge and thus enabled the federal 
judiciary to continue to benefit from the service of many dedicated and 
experienced judges.”27 This allows federal judges to take one of four paths:28 
(1) judges can continue in active service until they die;29 
(2) judges can take “senior status” at some point before death (provided they 
continue to provide substantial service to the court), which allows them 
to continue receiving both a salary and salary increases;30 
(3) judges can “retire,” which means they receive an annual salary without 
salary increases, but can re-enter private practice;31 or 
(4) judges can “resign,” which allows them to enter (lucrative) private 
practice, but means that all compensation ceases and there are no federal 
retirement benefits.32 
                                                                                                                     
 22 Indeed, there is a shortage of younger long-haul truck drivers. Linda Longton, The 
Driver Deficit: Who Will Drive the Future?, COM. CARRIER J. (May 28, 2018), 
https://www.ccjdigital.com/the-driver-deficit-who-will-drive-the-future/ [https://perma 
.cc/GGK5-LVLB].  
 23 ALICIA H. MUNNELL, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH, THE AVERAGE RETIREMENT AGE – 
AN UPDATE 1 (Mar. 2015); ALICIA H. MUNNELL, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH, WHAT IS THE 
AVERAGE RETIREMENT AGE? 5 (Aug. 2011).  
 24 Demography of Article III Judges, supra note 17. 
 25 See Yoon, supra note 18, at 70 (discussing why federal judges stay on the bench). 
 26 The introduction of senior status has been described as an “ingenious” and “elegant 
response” to the problem that, absent this senior status option, judges would face strong 
financial incentives to remain in active status. Betty Binns Fletcher, A Response to Stras & 
Scott’s Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 523, 524 (2007). 
 27 Frederic Block, Senior Status: An “Active” Senior Judge Corrects Some Common 
Misunderstandings, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 533, 535 (2007). It is beyond the scope of this 
article, but worth noting, that there has been academic debate over the constitutionality of 
the senior status statute. Compare David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges 
Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 453, 456 (2007), with Fletcher, supra note 26, at 
524. 
 28 Block, supra note 27, at 536. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id.  
 31 Id.  
 32 Id.  
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Today, senior status can be claimed by any Article III judge or justice “after 
meeting the age and service requirements of the ‘Rule of Eighty’—your age and 
years of service must add up to eighty, you must be at least sixty-five years old, 
and you must have been on the bench for at least ten years.”33 A judge who takes 
senior status does not fully retire.34 Rather, “senior judges continue to perform 
the same judicial duties and receive the same salary as active judges.”35 Senior 
status is attractive to judges because it allows judges to continue their 
professional lives36 and provides them with more control over the cases they 
hear.37 Judges’ decisions to take senior status are related to the judicial pension 
system,38 and the average age at which active judges take senior status has 
declined over time, likely because of “changing rules for pension qualification 
from seventy years (and ten years of service) to sixty-five years (and fifteen 
years of service).”39 
Data from the Federal Judicial Center makes clear that the vast majority of 
Article III judges move to senior status, rather than to full retirement. For most 
professions, one does not die on the job. Not so for federal judges. Federal 
Judicial Center data shows that nearly 75% of judges leave the bench because 
they die.40 As the Federal Judicial Center observes, “In recent decades, many 
federal judges have assumed senior status even though eligible for full 
retirement. This trend may help account for the growing proportion of judges 
whose terms have ended in death rather than resignation or retirement.”41  
Senior judges are presently 40% of the federal judiciary, and this number is 
likely to grow.42 Federal Judicial Center data finds that from 1997 to 2015, 
“senior-status judges presided over between approximately 15 and 25 percent 
                                                                                                                     
 33 Id. 
 34 Block, supra note 27, at 536. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 538. (“There are three principal advantages to taking senior status: (1) it allows 
the judge to continue with the judge’s coveted judicial career, the intellectual stimulation it 
affords, and the judge’s commitment to public service; (2) it gives the judge the opportunity 
to have more control over the quantity and quality of his or her workload, without loss of 
pay, provided the judge continues to perform ‘substantial service’; and (3) it creates a 
vacancy, thereby paving the way for additional judicial help for the courts.”). 
 37 Yoon, supra note 18, at 75 (“[Senior status judges] can elect to hear less than a full 
caseload and request inclusion or exclusion from certain types of cases.”). 
 38 Id. at 76 (observing based on analysis of judicial tenure that “senior status has been 
inextricably linked to judicial pensions”). 
 39 Id. at 78. Yoon’s data suggests that circuit judges tend, on average, to remain on 
active status longer, while district court judges are more likely to jump to senior status as 
soon as they are pension eligible. Albert Yoon, As You Like It: Senior Federal Judges and 
the Political Economy of Judicial Tenure, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 495, 533 (2005). 
 40 Demography of Article III Judges, supra note 17. 
 41 Id.  
 42 Yoon, supra note 18, at 95 (“[In 2014,] senior judges comprise 40 percent of the total 
number of judges. As judges live longer and as delays in judicial confirmations continue, the 
ratio is likely to skew towards more senior judges.”). 
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of all completed district court trials.”43 In some districts, however, that number 
is greater. In the Eastern District of New York in 2007, for instance, “senior 
district judges [had] on average higher caseloads than the active judges.”44 
Senior judges handle many high-profile cases. For instance, in 2017, eighty-
year-old Judge Nathaniel Gorton, of the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts, heard one of the first cases on President Trump’s travel ban.45 
The case involved, in the judge’s own words, a “flurry of activity,”46 and the 
opinion offered on February 3, 2017 came just a week after the Executive Order 
was issued on January 27, 2017.47  
C. State Judges 
States differ from the federal system in how judges are selected, elected, 
and retained.48 Without life tenure, in the states “the most common method of 
retention is some form of election: partisan, nonpartisan, or retention.”49 The 
prevalence of mandatory retirement ages, the retention machinery of elections, 
and the political reappointment process mean that older state judges have more 
difficult barriers to surpass than their federal counterparts if they wish to 
continue serving. As a result, it stands to reason that the average age of state 
judges would be lower than in the federal system.  
The best available data on the age of state judges comes from law professors 
Stacey George and Albert Yoon. George and Yoon lead a project called “The 
Gavel Gap,” in which they investigate whether the demographics of state court 
judges reflect the demographics of citizens in that state.50 They find a gap, on 
race and gender dimensions, between citizens and their judges.51 The study, 
which was supported by the American Constitution Society, is impressive 
because it is the first to widely collect comparable judicial demographic data 
                                                                                                                     
 43 Demography of Article III Judges, supra note 17 (figures from caseload reports of 
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts). 
 44 Block, supra note 27, at 540. 
 45 Louhghalam v. Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 26, 30 (D. Mass. 2017). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). 
 48 See generally HERBERT M. KRITZER, JUSTICES ON THE BALLOT: CONTINUITY AND 
CHANGE IN STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS (2015); Herbert M. Kritzer, Impact of 
Judicial Elections on Judicial Decisions, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 353 (2016) 
[hereinafter Kritzer, Impact].  
 49 Kritzer, Impact, supra note 48, at 356 (discussing how some states utilize 
reappointment, and how the process may vary by level of the court within the state). 
 50 See TRACEY E. GEORGE & ALBERT H. YOON, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW 
AND POLICY, THE GAVEL GAP: WHO SITS IN JUDGMENT ON STATE COURTS? 1 (Dec. 2014); 
see also Exposing the Gavel Gap, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/brand-
studio/goliath/exposing-the-gavel-gap/ [https://perma.cc/3TY5-Y3BK]. 
 51 See GEORGE & YOON, supra note 50; Exposing the Gavel Gap, supra note 50. 
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across the states.52 Although not the focus of their analysis, they observed birth 
year data for 5378 state judges (out of 10,295 in their total dataset).53 Based on 
this birth year data, they calculate average state judge age to be 59.6, with a 
median age of sixty (max age of eighty-eight).54 Twenty-four percent of judges 
are over age sixty-five, but only 1.4% of judges are over age seventy-five.55 This 
final statistic, suggesting that 99% of judges in state courts are age seventy-five 
or younger, likely reflects the effect of mandatory retirement ages and the more 
rigorous judicial retention process in the states. Another contributing factor to 
the differences in ages between state and federal judges is that federal judges 
often serve as state judges first. 
In addition, many states have mechanisms whereby a “retired” judge can be 
“recalled” into service without violating the mandatory retirement statute. To 
illustrate: in New Jersey, the state supreme court held that  
. . . the modern State Constitution of 1947 provides for mandatory retirement 
of judges, but the document is silent on the subject of recall. Nowhere does the 
plain language of the Constitution forbid recall . . . [or] conflict with temporary 
recall assignments because the two concepts are distinct. One prevents lifelong 
tenure; the other affords judges neither tenure nor a seven-year term and does 
not reverse a judge’s retirement.56  
Even within mandatory retirement regimes, then, older judges may be playing 
critical roles. 
While at present state judges appear to be younger, on average, than their 
federal counterparts, it is possible that state judges will start to serve longer as 
mandatory retirement ages are raised. Currently, thirty-two states have 
mandatory retirement ages for judges.57 But in several states, there are proposals 
to raise the mandatory retirement age or to eliminate it altogether.58 
Proponents of raising or eliminating the retirement age generally argue that 
“[v]ery competent jurists are being forced to retire in the primes of their 
careers.”59 Proponents also argue that states have formal processes to remove 
                                                                                                                     
 52 I thank Professors George and Yoon for sharing with me some of their findings on 
judicial age. 
 53 Email correspondence on file with author. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 State v. Buckner, 121 A.3d 290, 292 (N.J. 2015). 
 57 See FRANCIS X. SHEN, APPENDIX: TABLE OF MANDATED JUDICIAL RETIREMENT AGES 
BY STATE (2020), http://www.fxshen.com/FrancisShen_Appendix_StateJudicialRetirement 
Ages_FINAL.pdf [on file with the author] [hereinafter SHEN, APPENDIX]; see also discussion 
in Part V. 
 58 One reason for resistance to these proposals may be concern about the impact on state 
pensions. For instance, a judge may be concerned that a legislature would reduce judicial 
pensions if they were allowed (or expected) to work later into life beyond the mandatory 
retirement age. 
 59 Ashby Jones, A New Lease for Old Judges, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 5, 2013), https:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323699704578328214137916682 [https://per 
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judges on a case-by-case basis for age-related illness or cognitive impairment. 
In the words of Indiana State Senator Jim Buck, “[W]e can address these 
situations on a case-by-case basis . . . . We’ve got lawyers in their 80s whose 
minds are steel traps. There’s no reason to cast aside that kind of legal mind.”60 
Developments in the states include: 
 Maryland: In February 2018, a bill was proposed in the Maryland House 
that would give voters an opportunity to vote on a constitutional 
amendment to raise the mandatory judicial retirement age from seventy 
to seventy-three.61 
 Florida: In November 2018, Florida voters approved a state 
constitutional amendment to raise the mandatory retirement age for 
Florida Supreme Court justices from seventy to seventy-five years 
old.62 The amendment passed with 61.6% in favor and 38.4% 
opposing.63  
 Michigan: In 2017, the Michigan House Judiciary Committee re-
introduced and passed a measure to repeal the mandatory retirement age 
of seventy years old for state judges.64 This measure was first 
introduced in 2007 and has since been re-introduced three additional 
times: in 2011, 2013, and 2015.65 However, this most recent attempt 
represents the first successful approval from the Michigan House 
Judiciary Committee.66 
 Alabama: In 2019, during discussion of an amendment to the State 
Constitution in the House of Representatives, a proposed amendment to 
                                                                                                                     
ma.cc/8GHS-PYCH] (quoting Pennsylvania State Senator Stewart Greenleaf, who 
sponsored a bill to eliminate the judicial retirement age). 
 60 Id.  
 61 Diane Rey, Raising Retirement for Judges from 70 to 73 Gets Another Try, 
MARYLANDREPORTER.COM (Feb. 10, 2019), https://marylandreporter.com/2019/02/10/ 
raising-retirement-for-judges-from-70-to-73-gets-another-try/ [https://perma.cc/7LB8-
9C4X]. 
 62 Florida Amendment 6, Marsy’s Law Crime Victims Rights, Judicial Retirement Age, 
and Judicial Interpretation of Laws and Rules Amendment (2018), BALLOTPEDIA, https:// 
ballotpedia.org/Florida_Amendment_6,_Marsy%27s_Law_Crime_Victims_Rights,_Judi
cial_Retirement_Age,_and_Judicial_Interpretation_of_Laws_and_Rules_Amendment_(2
018) [https://perma.cc/EU8Z-D8BZ].  
 63 Id.  
 64 Michigan: Repeal of Mandatory Judicial Retirement Age Advances out of House 
Committee; Would Allow Judges Older than 70 to Run for or be Appointed to Judicial Office, 
GAVEL TO GAVEL (May 8, 2017), http://gaveltogavel.us/2017/05/08/michigan-repeal-
mandatory-judicial-retirement-age-advances-house-committee-allow-judges-older-70-
run-appointed-judicial-office/ [https://perma.cc/2HGT-AFMZ]. 
 65 Id.  
 66 Id.  
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raise the judicial retirement age to seventy-five from seventy was struck 
down (18 in favor, 73 against).67  
 New York: In 2013, the New York Mandatory Judicial Retirement Age 
Amendment (Proposition 6), which would have raised the mandatory 
judicial retirement age from seventy years old to eighty years old for 
Supreme Court justices and Court of Appeals judges, was defeated 
(39% supporting, 61% opposed).68 In addition, leaders of the New York 
Reform Party sued to remove the New York judicial age limit in 2017.69 
Though a filed paper indicates that a trial court in New York accepted 
the filing,70 as of 2019, the New York judicial age limit of seventy years 
has not been removed.71  
 Oregon: In 2016, the Oregon Elimination of Mandatory Judicial 
Retirement Age Amendment (Measure 94), a measure that would 
remove the constitutional amendment requiring mandatory retirement 
of judges once they turn seventy-five years old and prevent future 
legislatures from re-establishing a retirement age for judges, was 
defeated (63% opposed, 37% in favor).72  
 Pennsylvania: In 2016, a constitutional amendment to raise the 
mandatory retirement age for Pennsylvania judges from seventy to 
seventy-five years old was narrowly passed (50.6% in favor, 49.4% 
                                                                                                                     
 67 Brandon Moseley, House Rejects Effort to Raise the Retirement Age for State Judges 
to Age 75, ALA. POL. REP. (May 16, 2019), https://www.alreporter.com/2019/05/16 
/house-rejects-effort-to-raise-the-retirement-age-for-state-judges-to-age-75/ [https:// 
perma.cc/S9S8-DYU8]. 
 68 James C. McKinley, Jr., Plan to Raise Judges’ Retirement Age to 80 Is Rejected, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/nyregion/plan-to-raise-
judges-retirement-age-to-80-is-rejected.html [https://perma.cc/2HP8-6U9E]. Controversy 
surrounded the proposition because it would have severely curtailed the ability of Governor 
Andrew Cuomo, a member of the Democratic party, from “shaping the state’s highest court,” 
as passage of the measure would have allowed two Republican judges to serve longer terms. 
Id. The governor “quietly opposed the measure in the Legislature and lobbied editorial 
boards to urge people to vote no.” Id. 
 69 Jon Lentz, Reform Party Files Suit to Overturn New York’s Age Limit on Judges, 
CITY & ST. N.Y. (July 3, 2017), https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/politics/new-
york-state-articles/reform-party-sues-to-overturn-new-york-age-limit-on-judges.html 
[https://perma.cc/N7SY-F5GN]. 
 70 See generally Complaint of Petitioner, Morano v. Bd. of Elections of New York, No. 
080055/17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 28, 2017), https://www.scribd.com/document/352773965 
/Judicial-retirement-age-lawsuit#from_embed [https://perma.cc/N6DE-EXQP]. 
 71 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 25. 
 72 Oregon Elimination of Mandatory Judicial Retirement Age, Measure 94 (2016), 
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Elimination_of_Mandatory_Judicial_ 
Retirement_Age,_Measure_94_(2016) [https://perma.cc/KRY5-ZHZS]. 
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opposing), despite controversy over the question’s ambiguous 
wording.73  
* * * 
The federal judiciary is older than ever before. The state judiciary, while 
younger, still has 25% of its judges at ages between sixty-five and seventy-five. 
Moreover, there is some momentum in the states to raise age levels for judges. 
But are these trends toward an older judiciary a problem? To begin answering 
this question, Part III reviews the science of age-related cognitive decline.  
III. AGE, COGNITIVE DECLINE, AND THE EMERGENCE OF BRAIN 
BIOMARKERS OF DEMENTIA 
This Part provides an overview of the known effects of aging on cognitive 
function, particularly the changes in cognition that may adversely affect a 
judge’s ability to effectively carry out all the duties of the office.74 Part A 
examines average population trends in aging and cognition, and Part B explores 
individual differences in aging trajectories. Part C provides discussion of the 
brain basis for age-related changes in mental function.  
Since ancient times, it has been recognized that with age comes cognitive 
decline.75 Virgil, for instance, lamented that, “Time robs us all, even of 
memory.”76 What is novel about contemporary understanding of age-related 
mental decline is our increasing ability to pinpoint and even predict that decline 
in brain circuitry.77  
                                                                                                                     
 73 Jan Murphy, Pennsylvania Voters Approve Raising Judges’ Retirement Age, 
PENNLIVE (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.pennlive.com/politics/2016/11/pennsylvania_ 
voters_approve_ra.html [https://perma.cc/BG5C-XD2J] (last updated Jan. 5, 2019). Two 
former chief justices from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sued on the grounds that the 
measure was intentionally “phrased in a deceitful way . . . by the Republican-controlled 
legislature” in an effort to manipulate the vote. Angela Couloumbis, Pa. Voters Narrowly 
Backing Raising Judges’ Retirement Age, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 8, 2016), https:// 
www.inquirer.com/philly/news/politics/20161109_Pa__voters_narrowly_back_raising
_judges__retirement _ages.html [https://perma.cc/4U4E-744B]. 
 74 Aging judges may be problematic for reasons unrelated to cognitive health. My 
primary focus here, however, is on the potential for cognitive decline. 
 75 Denise C. Park & Sara B. Festini, Theories of Memory and Aging: A Look at the Past 
and a Glimpse of the Future, 72 J. GERONTOLOGY: PSYCHOL. SCI. 82, 82 (2017). 
 76 KAREN COKAYNE, EXPERIENCING OLD AGE IN ANCIENT ROME 67 (2003). 
 77 Denise C. Park & Patricia Reuter-Lorenz, The Adaptive Brain: Aging and 
Neurocognitive Scaffolding, 60 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 173, 174 (2009) (“For the past 25 years, 
our understanding of the behavioral changes that occur in cognition with age has increased 
tremendously, and in the past 10 years, the advent of neuroimaging tools has ushered a truly 
stunning increase in what we know about the aging mind.”). 
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The brain is made up of circuits of cells.78 In the developing brain, even in 
the womb, cells are forming connections and pathways that may last for much 
of one’s life.79 But over time these pathways can deteriorate; as brain circuits 
lose the ability to communicate, some cognitive functioning may become 
affected.80 Exactly how these circuits change—and what can be done to reverse 
or mitigate the effects—is the subject of much research.81 
In 2018, the National Institutes of Aging and the Alzheimer’s Association 
formally called for a research framework that defines Alzheimer’s disease (AD) 
based on neurobiology instead of symptoms.82 Part C discusses why brain 
biomarkers for AD are ushering in a paradigm shift for AD definition and 
detection. 
A. Group Averaged Cognitive Decline 
Age-related cognitive decline is traditionally thought to begin in the later 
stages of life, between the ages of fifty and sixty, with exacerbated rates of 
decline noted for individuals over the age of seventy.83 Yet recent longitudinal 
research suggests that cognitive decline can begin as early as age thirty, with 
different rates of decline noted for different skills like memory, reasoning, 
spatial visualization, and processing speed.84  
Age-related trajectories vary according to cognitive domain. One distinction 
made in the literature, and relevant to judicial function, is the difference between 
“fluid intelligence” and “crystallized intelligence.”85 Fluid intelligence might be 
thought of as processing speed and the ability to learn new tasks.86 Crystallized 
intelligence is something more akin to wisdom.87  
                                                                                                                     
 78 Esteban Real et al., Neural Circuit Inference from Function to Structure, 27 CURRENT 
BIOLOGY 189, 189 (2017) (noting that “neuroscience seeks to explain brain function in terms 
of the dynamics in circuits of nerve cells”). 
 79 Moriah E. Thomason, Structured Spontaneity: Building Circuits in the Human 
Prenatal Brain, 41 TRENDS NEUROSCIENCES 1, 1 (2018). 
 80 John H. Morrison & Patrick R. Hof, Life and Death of Neurons in the Aging Brain, 
278 SCIENCE 412, 417 (1997); Rachel D. Samson & Carol A. Barnes, Impact of Aging Brain 
Circuits on Cognition, 37 EUR. J. NEUROSCIENCE 1903, 1909 (2013). 
 81 See, e.g., Patrick R. Hof & John H. Morrison, The Aging Brain: Morphomolecular 
Senescence of Cortical Circuits, 27 TRENDS NEUROSCIENCES 607, 607 (2004). 
 82 Clifford R. Jack, Jr. et al., NIA-AA Research Framework: Toward a Biological 
Definition of Alzheimer’s Disease, 14 ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA 535, 535 (2018). 
 83 Timothy A. Salthouse, When Does Age-Related Cognitive Decline Begin?, 30 
NEUROBIOLOGY AGING 507, 508 (2009). 
 84 Id. at 511. 
 85 John L. Horn & Raymond B. Cattell, Age Differences in Fluid and Crystallized 
Intelligence, 26 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 107, 107–11 (1967). 
 86 See John L. Horn, The Theory of Fluid and Crystallized Intelligence in Relation to 
Concepts of Cognitive Psychology and Aging in Adulthood, in 8 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY 
OF COMMUNICATION AND AFFECT: AGING AND COGNITIVE PROCESSES 237, 240 (F. I. M. 
Craik & Sandra Trehub eds., 1982). 
 87 Id. 
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In an oft-cited study, psychologist Alan Kaufman sampled 1500 men and 
women to determine how fluid intelligence and crystallized intelligence change 
over time, from adolescence to late adulthood.88 Kaufman found that fluid 
intelligence increases until late adolescence, but then begins to decline in early 
adulthood, with a faster rate of decline in late adulthood (around fifty-five years 
of age).89 In contrast, crystallized intelligence remained stagnant until late 
adulthood (around sixty years of age), and then begins to slowly decline.90 Other 
studies have come to similar findings using various intelligence scales, and 
some studies suggest that crystallized intelligence may actually continue to 
increase across the lifespan.91  
Given these different trajectories of fluid and crystallized intelligence, it is 
possible that crystallized intelligence might “attenuate the effects” of age-
related declines in fluid intelligence, allowing older adults to call upon their 
extensive life experiences to “offset the declining ability to process and 
manipulate new information.”92 Whether fluid or crystallized intelligence 
dominates the decision-making process depends on the nature of the decision 
itself; some situations rely more heavily on one form of decision-making over 
the other, and some situations require both types equally.93 
Of importance to judging, research suggests that “executive function” and, 
in particular, memory may become impaired in older age.94 Executive function 
consists of “control processes responsible for planning, assembling, 
coordinating, sequencing, and monitoring other cognitive operations,” 
essentially existing as a mediator of brain behavior.95 With regard to memory,  
“long-term memory and working memory are commonly impaired while rote 
retrieval of word meaning (vocabulary) and priming remain relatively intact.”96 
                                                                                                                     
 88 Alan S. Kaufman & John L. Horn, Age Changes on Tests of Fluid and Crystallized 
Ability for Women and Men on the Kaufman Adolescent and Adult Intelligence Test (KAIT) 
at Ages 17–94 Years, 11 ARCHIVES CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 97, 97 (1996). Kaufman 
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 89 Id. at 106. 
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 91 Lisa Zaval et al., Complementary Contributions of Fluid and Crystallized 
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EMPIRICAL AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 149, 150 (Thomas Hess et al. eds., 2015). 
 92 Id. at 154. 
 93 Id. at 154–55. 
 94 Randy L. Buckner, Memory and Executive Function in Aging and AD: Multiple 
Factors that Cause Decline and Reserve Factors that Compensate, 44 NEURON 195, 196 
(2004); Sarah F. MacPherson et al., Age, Executive Function, and Social Decision Making: 
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 95 Timothy A. Salthouse et al., Executive Functioning as a Potential Mediator of Age-
Related Cognitive Decline in Normal Adults, 132 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 566, 566 
(2003). 
 96 Buckner, supra note 94, at 195. 
2020] AGING JUDGES 251 
Given the judge’s role vis-à-vis litigants and staff in the courtroom, it is also 
important to note that age-related brain changes affect one’s ability to interact 
socially.97 Healthy social behavior heavily relies on a capacity often labeled as 
“theory of mind.”98 Theory of Mind (TOM) is “the capacity to infer the likely 
thoughts and intentions of others.”99 TOM capacity is involved in everyday 
social skills, including “detect[ing] . . . deception, faux pas and cheating.”100 
Both affective decision-making and TOM may be impaired in individuals with 
dementia.101  
B. Individual Differences in Aging Trajectories 
While, on average, older adults experience impairment in a variety of 
cognitive functions, there is considerable individual variation in the nature and 
extent of those changes.102 In the context of memory ability, for instance, some 
individuals start forgetting early, but “[s]ome individuals show high functioning 
into their ninth and tenth decades.”103 Indeed, available data suggests that there 
are roughly four trajectories of cognition change over time.104 Compared to 
baseline performance at thirty-five years old, humans may experience:105 
 Super aging, in which there is little to no cognitive decline, and mental 
faculties remain highly functioning even in later ages; 
 Normal aging, in which there is some decline in cognitive performance, 
but not so much that it affects daily activity; 
                                                                                                                     
 97 Julie D. Henry et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Age Differences in Theory of Mind, 
28 PSYCHOL. & AGING 826, 826 (2013). 
 98 See Joseph M. Moran, Lifespan Development: The Effects of Typical Aging on 
Theory of Mind, 237 BEHAV. BRAIN RES. 32, 33 (2013). 
 99 Teresa Torralva et al., The Relationship Between Affective Decision-Making and 
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NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 342, 342 (2007). 
 100 Id. (citations omitted). 
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Lifespan (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.slideshare.net/petrieflom/bruce-price-cognitive-
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 105 Sandra Weintraub, Cognitive Neurology & Alzheimer’s Disease Ctr., Northwestern 
Univ. Feinberg Sch. of Med., Presentation: How Aging Affects the Brain and Memory: From 
Alzheimer’s Disease to SuperAging (on file with Ohio State Law Journal). 
252 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:2 
 Mild cognitive impairment, in which there is accelerated cognitive 
decline, but not rising to the level of significantly affecting daily life; 
and 
 Pathologic aging or dementia, in which there is accelerated cognitive 
decline that does impair daily functioning.  
Why some individuals follow one path or another remains poorly 
understood.106 Super Agers, for instance, retain their intellectual abilities late 
into their lives, without significant declines in memory, attention, language, or 
executive function tests.107 Researchers have begun to identify anatomic and 
genetic factors that distinguish Super Agers.108 But the mechanistic causes of 
these changes, whether they result from a higher baseline intelligence or from a 
genetic or environmental resistance to age-related decline, remain yet to be 
determined.109 
There is strong evidence that diet and exercise are protective factors for 
avoiding dementia,110 but researchers and pharmaceutical companies have been 
attempting to identify other protective factors or mechanisms that slow the rate 
of impairment or halt its progression altogether.111 Such factors include: 
recruitment of a “cognitive reserve,” which allows adults to utilize different 
cognitive skills to accommodate for their diminishing capacity in other skills; 
mentally stimulating activity; and physical exercise.112 
The construct of “cognitive reserve” was developed to help explain why “in 
the face of neurodegenerative changes that are similar in nature and extent, 
                                                                                                                     
 106 Felicia W. Sun et al., Youthful Brains in Older Adults: Preserved Neuroanatomy in 
the Default Mode and Salience Networks Contributes to Youthful Memory in Superaging, 37 
J. NEUROSCIENCE 9659, 9666 (2016). 
 107 See Emily J. Rogalski et al., Youthful Memory Capacity in Old Brains: Anatomic and 
Genetic Clues from the Northwestern SuperAging Project, 25 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 
29, 33–34 (2012); Sun et al., supra note 106, at 9664–65. 
 108 Nicholas T. Bott et al., Youthful Processing Speed in Older Adults: Genetic, 
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 110 Neal D. Barnard et al., Dietary and Lifestyle Guidelines for the Prevention of 
Alzheimer’s Disease, 35 NEUROBIOLOGY AGING S74, S77 (2014); Nikolaos Scarmeas et al., 
Physical Activity, Diet, and Risk of Alzheimer Disease, 302 JAMA 627, 627 (2009).  
 111 Claire Mount & Christian Downton, Alzheimer Disease: Progress or Profit?, 12 
NATURE MED. 780, 784 (2006) (noting that “[a]lthough current treatments for Alzheimer 
disease have witnessed phenomenal sales growth and will continue to do so, they have 
provided only modest symptomatic relief, and much of their success appears to be borne of 
the significant unmet need”). 
 112 Dennis J. Selkoe, Preventing Alzheimer’s Disease, 337 SCIENCE 1488, 1491 (2012); 
see Lawrence J. Whalley et al., Cognitive Reserve and the Neurobiology of Cognitive Aging, 
3 AGEING RES. REVIEWS 369, 375 (2004). 
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individuals vary considerably in the severity of cognitive aging.”113 The 
cognitively capable adult brain can withstand age-related decline much better 
than individuals with less cognitive capabilities.114  
Because judges are highly educated, it is relevant to note research finding 
that environmental factors such as higher childhood intelligence and higher 
educational attainment are protective against later-life cognitive decline.115 
Mentally stimulating activity may also protect against cognitive decline.116  
C. The Neurobiology of Aging 
Research has emerged on age-related changes in both the normal and 
diseased state. In this Section, I first review brain changes in normal aging, and 
then turn to the pathology of Alzheimer’s disease (AD).  
1. The Aging Brain 
Advances in neuroimaging techniques have made it easier to identify age-
related structural and functional changes in the brain.117 Changes over time 
include:  
 A reduction in regional brain volume, with certain areas of the brain 
appearing to be more susceptible to volume loss, including the frontal 
and parietal lobes.118  
                                                                                                                     
 113 Whalley et al., supra note 112, at 369. 
 114 See id. at 374.  
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Decline, 137 PSYCHOL. BULL. 753, 759 (2011). 
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 Disruptions in brain network connectivity, described as a reduction in 
white matter integrity, with the largest effects being observed in the 
frontal regions of the brain, which are important for planning and 
decision-making.119 
Some evidence suggests that older adults recruit different brain networks to 
solve the same problems as younger adults.120 The aging brain may be organized 
differently than the younger brain, but it may still be able to accomplish many 
of the same tasks.121 
Within the prefrontal cortex, age-related changes to the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex may be of particular importance.122 This region is primarily 
thought to be involved in executive function and complex reasoning.123 By 
comparison, few age-related changes occur in the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex, which is thought to be involved in emotion detection.124 Age-related 
impairment in the function of the prefrontal cortex may be mediated through 
dysfunction of the dopaminergic system in the brain.125 Dopamine is the 
primary neurotransmitter in the prefrontal cortex and striatal systems, and 
disruptions to the dopaminergic system mediate age-related declines in 
cognition, including executive function, episodic memory, and processing 
speed.126  
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BIOBEHAVIORAL REVIEWS 670, 675 (2010). 
 126 Id. at 670, 675. 
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2. Neurobiology of Alzheimer’s Disease 
In 2010, an estimated 4.7 million Americans aged sixty-five and older 
suffered from Alzheimer’s disease (AD); by 2050, this number is projected to 
reach 13.8 million.127 Although there is currently no cure for AD,128 new 
neuroimaging techniques are being developed to detect biomarkers for 
Alzheimer’s in its earliest stages.129 Such biomarkers can identify atrophying 
neural tissue in people with AD before they manifest observable behavioral 
changes.130 In 2004, the Alzheimer’s Disease Neuroimaging Initiative (ADNI) 
was formed to develop a range of biomarkers—including imaging, genetic, and 
biochemical markers—for the early detection and monitoring of AD.131 For 
clinicians, this early detection can help facilitate prevention or help slow the 
disease’s progression.132 
New diagnostic options for clinical use are emerging.133 In 2012, the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) approved an imaging technique that uses 
positron emission tomography (PET) scanning with the radioactive tracing 
compound Florbetapir F-18 to identify the accumulation of amyloid-β (Aβ) 
plaques, which are believed to play a central role in AD.134 
In addition, the National Institute of Aging and the Alzheimer’s Association 
have worked over the past decade to better define and identify the preclinical 
(i.e., without symptoms) stages of AD.135 In 2011, the working group “created 
separate diagnostic recommendations for the preclinical, mild cognitive 
impairment, and dementia stages of Alzheimer’s disease.”136 In 2018, on the 
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Workgroups on Diagnostic Guidelines for Alzheimer’s Disease, 7 ALZHEIMER’S & 
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basis of ongoing neuroscience research, the same working group published a 
landmark paper in which it proposed a diagnosis of AD that was “not based on 
the clinical consequences of the disease (i.e., symptoms/signs),” but which 
“shifts the definition of AD in living people from a syndromal to a biological 
construct.”137 The proposed “research framework focuses on the diagnosis of 
AD with biomarkers in living persons.”138 Specifically, AD would require a 
finding of both Aβ plaques and pathologic tau deposits.139  
More broadly, the framework introduced an “Alzheimer’s continuum,” 
which would include both those with Alzheimer’s disease (i.e., those with the 
established biomarkers) and those in the category of “Alzheimer’s pathologic 
change,” an “early stage of Alzheimer’s continuum, defined in vivo by an 
abnormal Aβ biomarker with normal pathologic tau biomarker.”140 Notably, 
and important for the analysis to follow in the judicial context, under this 
framework an individual (such as a judicial nominee) could be both symptom-
free and diagnosed as being on the Alzheimer’s continuum.141 
Under the new framework, for many individuals there will be a lengthy 
period (fifteen to twenty years) of brain change without symptoms.142 As lead 
author Clifford Jack observed: “In every other area where biomarkers exist—
hypertension, diabetes, cancer—the disease identified in an asymptomatic 
individual is still the disease. If cancer is detected on a screening colonoscopy, 
it’s still cancer, even if the person doesn’t have symptoms.”143 
The transition from symptom-based to biologically based detection of AD 
offers clinicians an opportunity to intervene earlier in the progression of the 
disease.144 The proposed framework would fundamentally change the definition 
of AD; not surprisingly, it has been heavily debated.145 Chief amongst the 
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critiques is that it is too early to use biomarkers because the “extent and quality 
of diagnostic biomarker data currently available is still in its infancy.”146 
For purposes of evaluating judicial cognitive function, the availability of 
new biomarkers—even if they were to be used for assessing risk, not 
diagnosis—raises both promise and peril. I discuss this further in Part V. 
IV. JUDICIAL COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT: THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
Part II established that America’s judiciary is aging.147 Part III established 
that, on average, age is associated with cognitive decline in domains of cognitive 
function that are relevant to judging.148 But it does not necessarily follow that a 
sufficiently large number of sitting judges are, or will become, cognitively 
impaired to the point that they cannot execute their duties. This is because judges 
may be a subgroup with particularly strong cognitive reserve; because judges 
may effectively self-police and leave the bench before significant decline; 
and/or because the existing system adequately intervenes when needed.  
Part IV explores these possibilities, in particular whether self-policing and 
existing policies for addressing judicial cognitive decline are adequate as 
presently designed. Section A argues that there is reason for concern about age-
related cognitive decline in judges. Section B then considers at length whether 
the current federal system is adequate to address instances of judicial cognitive 
decline.  
A. Concerns About Judicial Age-Related Cognitive Decline 
Although the thrust of my argument is that we should be empowering aging 
judges, it is important to clarify that I am not arguing there is no cause for 
concern. Although there is no direct evidence available to estimate the 
prevalence of cognitive decline in state and federal judges, there is some 
empirical data suggesting this is the case,149 and a strong circumstantial case 
can be made that commentators’ concerns are not unreasonable. At the outset, 
though, because childhood intelligence and education levels are protective 
factors against dementia,150 it seems plausible that judges as a group might have 
lower incidence rates of mild cognitive impairment and Alzheimer’s disease.151 
                                                                                                                     
 146 Id. at 241. 
 147 See supra Part II. 
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 149 See, e.g., David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim 
Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 258 (2008). 
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But even if we assume that judges have a lower rate of AD than the general 
public, it leaves open the question of whether that rate is still high enough to 
warrant concern, and whether the deficits that attach to normal cognitive 
aging—which might not affect daily living activities—are of concern when 
carrying out the judicial function.  
Put another way: does the judicial nomination and selection process select 
only for Super Agers? If all judges were Super Agers, there would be little cause 
for concern with aging judges from the perspective of mental decline on the 
bench. 
Without direct evidence, it is impossible to rule out the possibility. If 10% 
of the population are Super Agers, then it is mathematically possible that all of 
the 30,000 state judges and 1700 Article III judges are Super Agers.152 
However, this seems highly unlikely.  
First, despite the fantasy on airport bookshelves that we can “All Become 
‘Super Agers,’”153 Super Agers comprise only 10−20% of the population.154 
This does not mean that the other 80–90% of the population will develop a form 
of dementia, or even mild cognitive impairment, but it does mean that skills such 
as memory recall almost always decline with age.155 Second, although possible, 
it seems implausible that the legal system would be selecting for Super Agers 
as judges when scientists do not yet know the factors that distinguish those who 
will age normally versus those who will be high functioning outliers.156 
In addition, multiple interviews with physicians who diagnose dementia 
suggest that they are regularly (albeit not frequently) contacted by concerned 
colleagues and friends of judges.157 Notably, it is often not the judges 
themselves who reach out, but someone who is concerned about the judge.158 
While my limited number of interviews does not constitute a representative 
sample, it is worth noting that these care providers agree with the general 
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Patterns of Care in the Early Stages of Alzheimer’s Disease: Impediments to Timely 
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proposition that there is reason to be concerned about undiagnosed cognitive 
decline on the bench.159 This is in part, as discussed above, because decline is 
often subtle and hard to detect.160 
For these reasons, as well as the extensive record (reviewed below) of 
documented instances of judicial cognitive decline,161 I will proceed on what I 
take to be a reasonable assumption that all judges are not Super Agers, that some 
judges will experience normal cognitive aging, and that some judges will 
experience either mild cognitive impairment or some form of more progressive 
dementia. 
B. Responding to Judicial Cognitive Decline 
Concerns over mentally incompetent judges have been recognized since the 
time of the country’s founding,162 and a variety of solutions have been 
implemented to address these concerns.163 As legal scholar Charles Geyh has 
observed, “As the sheer number of attempts at legislation imply, judicial 
disability has posed a chronic problem for Congress.”164  
Public allegations of the mental incompetence of judges are rare,165 but this 
“reveal[s] little about the true extent of the problem”166 because there has 
traditionally been a taboo on openly discussing the issue of declining capacity 
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of fellow judges.167 Indeed, in 1971, the Supreme Court chided a circuit court 
for broaching “so delicate a subject” when the circuit court raised concerns 
about the mental competence of a state court judge in a published opinion.168 
However, judges have since noted that “[w]e have come a long way from the 
day when discussion of a judge’s mental state was considered a breach of 
decorum.”169 
Here, I review several (non-mutually exclusive) avenues by which the 
challenge of cognitively impaired judges can be addressed within the current 
system: (1) create incentives for the judge to voluntarily choose retirement, (2) 
involuntarily remove the judge on the basis of disability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 372; (3) file a formal complaint under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act; 
(4) pursue post-hoc relief via a due process claim; and (5) apply informal 
pressures to encourage the judge to retire. The available evidence suggests that 
the last option, informal mechanisms, remains the primary method by which 
most issues are resolved.  
1. Creating Incentives for Judicial Retirement 
A straightforward way to address the issue of aging judges is to create 
stronger incentives for retirement. This was the first response from Congress, in 
1869, when it passed a law to allow judges to retire at age seventy and receive 
the same salary as when active.170 The Act spurred a number of retirements.171 
The introduction of senior status in 1919,172 however, changed the nature 
of retirement. Judges were now able to continue to serve on a reduced 
caseload.173 Emily Field Van Tassel’s extensive study on judicial retirement 
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finds that senior status, as opposed to full resignation of duties, is by far the 
more attractive option.174 Van Tassel finds that “[f]rom 1980 to 1989, at least 
197 judges retired from regular active service (took ‘senior status’),” while only 
“fourteen ‘retired from the office.’”175 In the period 1990 to 1992, 86% of 
judges elected senior status over outright retirement.176 
If moving to senior status required a cognitive assessment, we could have 
more confidence that there was a correlation between taking senior status and 
likelihood of remaining mentally sharp. But as present, to move to senior status, 
a “judge simply writes a letter to the President stating that on a particular date 
the judge intends to retire from regular active service, having met the requisite 
age and service requirements, and that the judge intends to continue to render 
substantial judicial service as a senior judge.”177 
Historically, there has been concern that retirement alone would not be 
enough to account for disabled judges.178 In 1809, Congress passed a law 
“requiring the Supreme Court justice assigned to the circuit in which there was 
a disabled district judge to issue certiorari to the clerk of the district court to 
certify all pending matters to the next circuit court.”179 In 1850, further 
Congressional action required that a district judge from another district be 
brought in to carry out the work of the disabled judge.180 
2. Involuntary Removal for Disability 
In 1919, Congress first gave to the President the power to appoint a new, 
temporary judge in a district where a disabled judge sits.181 The current statute 
reads: 
(b) Whenever any judge of the United States appointed to hold office 
during good behavior who is eligible to retire under this section does not do so 
and a certificate of his disability signed by a majority of the members of the 
Judicial Council of his circuit in the case of a circuit or district judge, or by the 
Chief Justice of the United States in the case of the Chief Judge of the Court of 
International Trade, or by the chief judge of his court in the case of a judge of 
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the Court of International Trade, is presented to the President and the President 
finds that such judge is unable to discharge efficiently all the duties of his office 
by reason of permanent mental or physical disability and that the appointment 
of an additional judge is necessary for the efficient dispatch of business, the 
President may make such appointment by and with the advice and consent of 
the Senate.182 
Under this provision, the President’s appointment is temporary,183 and the 
disabled judge will be treated as a junior colleague to the temporarily appointed 
judge.184  
Although the potential for involuntary removal exists, it has rarely been 
used.185 The available historical record suggests that this involuntary disability 
provision has been invoked six times.186 It is rarely invoked because, as 
discussed below, informal application of pressure to retire is the primary 
mechanism by which the system responds to problem judges.187 
3. Due Process Claims on Grounds of Judges’ Mental Competence 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution guarantee 
that no person shall be deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law.”188 Courts typically “presume . . . that constitutional due process 
requires an impartial and mentally competent judicial officer.”189 However, the 
Supreme Court has never explicitly so held.190 It has held that, with respect to 
jurors, “a defendant has a right to ‘a tribunal both impartial and mentally 
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competent to afford a hearing.’”191 The Court has had the opportunity to extend 
this holding explicitly to judges but declined to do so.192  
Regardless of the constitutional status of claims about the mental capacity 
of a presiding judge, courts may be skeptical of such claims’ factual merits.193 
In Slayton v. Smith, a per curiam Supreme Court chastised as procedurally 
irregular the Fourth Circuit’s paean to the due process requirement of a mentally 
competent judiciary where the state judge in question had resigned within nine 
months of the defendant’s conviction allegedly after a complaint to the governor 
regarding his competence.194 Moreover, courts have been skeptical of 
allegations of mental incompetence in judges in other contexts of review.195 
In United States v. Washington,196 three Indian Tribes sought relief under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6)197 after a newspaper article reported 
that the relevant judge had Alzheimer’s disease when he ruled against them.198 
The article was published several years after the judge’s death and many years 
after the proceeding.199 In rejecting the Tribes’ motion for relief, the Ninth 
Circuit expressed skepticism about the evidence.200 The court pointed to the 
high abuse of discretion standard under which it was reviewing the case, as well 
as the fact that the judge’s son said his father had been competent at the time of 
the ruling,201 and that the judge was open about his medical problems during the 
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proceedings and the appellate court had affirmed his ruling on the merits.202 
Judge Kozinski filed an energetic concurrence in which he argued that the tribes’ 
evidence would have been sufficient, but that Rule 60(b)(6) does not permit 
relief on grounds of the judge’s mental incompetence.203 
Also illustrative is Deere v. Cullen.204 Judge Fred Metheny was appointed 
to California’s Riverside County Superior Court in 1971.205 In 1986, at age 64, 
he sentenced convicted murderer Ronald Deere to death.206 In 1993, Deere filed 
a federal habeas corpus petition to challenge his death sentence.207 While Deere 
sought federal habeas relief for traditional claims, such as whether he was 
competent to plead guilty,208 he also argued that Judge Metheny was mentally 
incompetent due to dementia at the time of the sentencing.209 
To support his claim, Deere offered four affidavits from attorneys.210 These 
attorneys observed, amongst other things, that there were rumors that Judge 
Metheny was suffering from Alzheimer’s at the time;211 that Judge Metheny’s 
“faculties seemed to have deteriorated over the years;”212 and that he made 
“strange rulings and off-hand remarks.”213 When Deere’s attorney attempted to 
contact Judge Metheny in 1993, Judge Metheny’s wife told her that he was ill, 
could not remember his cases, and had an “Alzheimer’s-type condition.”214 
In light of this, Deere requested additional discovery and an evidentiary 
hearing on Judge Metheny’s mental competence at the time of sentencing.215 A 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel, however, upheld the district court’s 
decision to deny Deere’s request.216 In the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, the central 
consideration was that Deere’s evidence consisted primarily of anecdotes that, 
in the Court’s view, “reveal[ed] no more than eccentricity as distinguished from 
dementia.”217 Moreover, the opinion emphasized that Deere “furnished 
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nothing—zero—from any mental health professional opining that any of the 
stories about Judge Metheny might be indicative of mental impairment.”218 
In a lengthy dissent, Judge William Fletcher challenged the majority: “The 
majority holds that a judge suffering from dementia may sentence a man to 
death. I disagree.”219 Fletcher provided a detailed review of the record, which 
suggested many instances of concerning behavior from Judge Metheny around 
the time of sentencing. For instance, in a local newspaper story in 1987, one 
anonymous attorney noted that Judge Metheny “appear[ed] to have little grasp 
of what’s going on.”220 
Looking backward, we will never know whether Judge Metheny was or was 
not mentally competent when he sentenced Ronald Deere to death. But looking 
forward, I argue in this Article that by expanding the use of cognitive health 
assessment tools in the judicial system, the system and the judges themselves 
will have more than speculation and anecdotes on which to base their decisions 
about judicial competence. 
4. The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 
A formal option to address judicial mental incapacity is the Judicial 
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 (“the 1980 
Act”).221 Before the 1980 Act, Congressional debate centered around two 
primary modes of promoting judicial accountability: “[T]he primary alternatives 
considered by Congress were (1) establishing a central body of judges with 
broad powers to discipline and even remove federal judges and (2) formalizing 
or augmenting the system of decentralized self-regulation already in place by 
virtue of the general powers of the judicial councils of the respective 
circuits.”222 During these debates, the Judicial Conference advocated for the 
decentralized system and argued that its informal mechanisms were already 
effective.223 Ultimately, the 1980 Act retained the decentralized self-regulation 
structure, but provided new procedural avenues for complaints.224  
                                                                                                                     
 218 Deere, 718 F.3d at 1127. 
 219 Id. at 1152. 
 220 Id. at 1156. 
 221 Judicial Council Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. 
No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035. 
 222 Jeffrey N. Barr & Thomas E. Willging, Decentralized Self-Regulation, 
Accountability, and Judicial Independence under the Federal Judicial Conduct and 
Disability Act of 1980, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 25, 29 (1993) (citations omitted). 
 223 In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 570 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009), as 
corrected (June 26, 2009). 
 224 See id. at 1153. The Council “pointed out to Congress that the circuit council, acting 
solely under the administrative authority conferred upon them by section 332, and without 
outside intervention, had established administrative procedures for handling complaints of 
judicial misconduct, and had for many years dealt quietly, informally, and effectively with 
‘problem judges’—disabled judges, alcoholic judges, senile judges, procrastinators.” Id. at 
1148. 
266 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:2 
The 1980 Act established an administrative procedure to handle complaints 
against federal judges for mental disability.225 Under the procedure, any person 
can file a complaint “alleging that a judge has engaged in conduct prejudicial to 
the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts, or 
alleging that such judge is unable to discharge all the duties of office by reason 
of mental or physical disability.”226  
When the chief judge receives a complaint, he or she determines whether 
the facts warrant forming an investigatory committee and may conduct a limited 
inquiry to do so.227 If the chief judge believes there are sufficient grounds, he or 
she forms a special committee including themselves and equal numbers of 
circuit and district judges of the circuit.228 This special committee conducts an 
investigation and files a comprehensive written report with the circuit council, 
with recommendations for action.229 The council can either dismiss the 
complaint or take a range of actions including: (1) temporary halting case 
assignments; (2) private or public censure; (3) certifying the judge’s disability 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 372(b); (4) requesting such judge’s voluntary 
retirement; or (5) ordering the removal from office of term-limited judges.230 
The council may also petition the Judicial Conference to take action, including 
advising the House of Representatives that impeachment may be warranted.231  
The complaint to the judicial council is not a request for judicial recusal, but 
rather “a separate action from the court case itself.”232 This means that the 
original proceeding can continue, and indeed could be resolved before the 
judicial council reaches the complaint.233 One open question in applying the 
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act is whether normal, age-related cognitive 
decline would constitute either a physical or mental “disability.”234 However 
defined, since the Act’s enactment, there have been few instances of formal 
complaints based on judicial disability.235 
The most extensive study of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 
was carried out by a study committee led by Associate Justice Stephen 
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Breyer.236 Published in 2006, the major conclusion of the report was that the 
Act was being properly implemented.237 Notably for the analysis in this Article, 
“[a]lmost all complaints allege misconduct rather than disability.”238  
Consistent with the intent of the Act’s sponsors, “informal efforts to resolve 
problems remain . . . the principal means by which the judicial branch deals with 
problems of judicial misconduct and disability.”239 Informal efforts are 
primarily directed at resolving issues of decisional delay, mental and physical 
disability, and complaints about the judge’s temperament.240 I turn now to an 
examination of those informal mechanisms. 
5. Informal Mechanisms 
Although the formal mechanisms discussed above are available, in practice 
it is informal approaches by which most judicial disability issues are 
addressed.241 This use of informal mechanisms is grounded in historical 
practice.242 As described in one study, these informal methods can require 
significant effort:  
Chief Judge Charles Clark [on the Fifth Circuit] used an assortment of 
techniques to induce three chief district judges then in their mid-80s to step 
down from their administrative posts. He applied pressure on one judge’s 
secretary, while in another case he made “use of a sort of high-grade 
blackmail,” by threatening “that the Bar Association was going to take the 
matter to the newspapers.” The entire proceeding is tortuous. One chief judge 
recalled it as being “rather unpleasant, both for the person who goes to see the 
aged judge and . . . for the aged judge himself.” So the Sixth Circuit Council 
had discovered in the Underwood affair. But, the chief judge declared: “We 
kept after him, and the largest newspaper in Ohio with statewide circulation 
published some accounts concerning the way he was handling his work, and 
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he finally called me up and said his name had been ‘dragged down in the mud 
far enough,’ and that he would retire, and he did retire.”243 
There is a legitimate debate about the effectiveness of these informal 
mechanisms. For instance, when the issue of mandatory retirement ages for 
federal judges was debated several decades ago, Judge Irving Kaufman wrote in 
the Yale Law Journal that the problem of failing judicial health “can almost 
always be managed effectively in a personal and informal manner. On occasion, 
close colleagues of an afflicted judge suggest that he retire. If necessary, other 
judges, attorneys, and even family members may approach the ailing jurist. 
Almost invariably he will acquiesce.”244  
My review that follows is not meant to evaluate the effectiveness of these 
informal policing methods as compared to the formal methods, but rather to 
evaluate whether the existing, informal system can be further improved. The 
informal policing system relies on individual judges to (1) recognize their own 
impairments and (2) take appropriate steps to leave the bench.245 But in the 
general population, individuals often underestimate their cognitive decline, and 
this happens to judges as well.246 Absent concrete evidence clearly showing the 
decline, the chief judge, family, and friends must often rely on arm-twisting.247  
a. How Informal Persuasion Works in Practice 
Concerns about mental decline on the Supreme Court are longstanding.248 
Historically, this challenge has been handled collegially.249 As political scientist 
David Atkinson observes, “The chief justices have traditionally borne the 
principal burden of dealing with incapacitated colleagues, which has all too 
frequently proved to be trying.”250 
A complicating factor for Supreme Court retirements is politics.251 Even 
when a judge recognizes his/her cognitive impairment, political commitments 
may motivate him/her.252 Justice William O. Douglas, for instance, once told a 
former law clerk, “‘Even if I’m only half alive . . . I can still cast a liberal 
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vote.’”253 Chief Justice William Howard Taft expressed a similar sentiment in 
1929 in a letter to his brother:  
I am older and slower and less acute and more confused. However . . . I 
must stay on the court in order to prevent the Bolsheviki from getting 
control . . . the only hope we have of keeping a consistent declaration of 
constitutional law is for us to live as long as we can.254 
Whether it is because the judge doesn’t recognize his/her own decline, 
because he/she wishes to stay despite the impairments, or for some other reason, 
there are examples of judges who continued to serve even though their cognition 
had significantly declined.255 The most extensive evidence comes from David 
Garrow’s treatment, in which he concludes that “the history of the Court is 
replete with repeated instances of justices casting decisive votes or otherwise 
participating actively in the Court’s work when their colleagues and/or families 
had serious doubts about their mental capacities.”256 Episodes of note include 
the following: 
 Justice Nathan Clifford (1858–1881) suffered from mental illness at the 
end of his tenure but could not be persuaded to resign in part because of 
his political commitments.257 
 Justice Stephen Field’s (1863−1897) “mental condition was in 
noticeable decline . . . [and] the other justices decided Field should be 
urged to resign.”258 But even with the urging of Justice John Marshall 
Harlan, Justice Field refused to resign until 1897.259 
 Justice Joseph McKenna’s (1898−1925) “mental alertness began to 
decline,” but he did not resign.260 As a result, in 1924, the remaining 
members of the Court decided “that no case would be decided because 
of McKenna’s vote.”261 
 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes retired only after Justice Hughes 
brought to his attention that his colleagues thought it best that he 
retire.262 David Garrow rightly observes that “even what may have been 
the single most distinguished career in the entire history of the United 
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States Supreme Court ended in an explicitly requested retirement 
because of increasing mental decrepitude.”263 
 Justice Marshall’s final years included embarrassing mistakes during an 
oral argument that gained national attention.264 
 Justice William O. Douglas experienced a stroke on December 31, 1974 
and did not fully recover.265 Douglas “repeatedly addressed people at 
the Court by their wrong names, often uttered nonsequiturs [sic] in 
conversation or simply stopped speaking altogether.”266 But rather than 
leave the Court, he stayed, and the rest of the Court (with the exception 
of Byron White) agreed that they would not allow Douglas to render 
votes.267 
Examples such as these have led some commentators to call for reform in 
judicial terms and retirement.268 In their argument in favor of introducing 
Supreme Court term limits, Steven Calabresi and James Lindgren observed: 
Of the twenty-three Justices who served longer than eighteen years and who 
retired since 1897, fully eight (35%) were mentally or seriously physically 
decrepit. Perhaps most stark is that nearly half of the last eleven Justices to 
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leave office (45%) were mentally decrepit and half of the last six Justices to 
leave office were mentally decrepit in their last years on the Court.269  
Moreover, Garrow found that “a thorough survey of Supreme Court 
historiography reveals that mental decrepitude has been an even more frequent 
problem on the twentieth-century Court than it was during the nineteenth.”270 
One of the additional enabling factors in the modern era is the advent of 
more law clerks for federal judges.271 These clerks may be taking on duties that 
their old, ailing judge should be. David Lat, writing for Above the Law, recounts 
just such an experience he observed with a fellow clerk: 
When I clerked on the Ninth Circuit years ago, one of the judges on the 
court at the time was extremely old—and didn’t seem very “with it.” His law 
clerks seemed to take on a large amount of responsibility. One of his clerks that 
year, a law school classmate of mine I’ll call “Mary,” would negotiate over the 
phone with Ninth Circuit judges over how particular cases should come out—
a responsibility well beyond the legal research and opinion drafting done by 
most clerks. 
On one occasion, a vote on whether to rehear a case en banc emanated not 
from the judge’s chambers account, but from Mary’s personal email account. 
Even more embarrassingly, it was written not on behalf of the judge or the 
chambers, but in the first person: “I vote YES to rehearing en banc.” A law 
school classmate of mine who was also clerking for the Ninth that year 
remarked, “I thought only judges did that. When did Mary get her presidential 
commission?”272 
To function, the modern system of informal checks requires a referee such 
as Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook (7th Cir.), who has taken the lead in asking 
colleagues to see neurologists when they show symptoms of memory loss.273 
But such safeguards can fail. For example, a joint Slate/ProPublica 
investigation found that Judge John Shabaz (Madison, WI) “had trouble reading 
things out loud, such as plea agreements,” and that “[i]n August 2006, before 
announcing a 20-year sentence, Shabaz forgot to offer a convicted drug dealer 
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the chance to ask for mercy.”274 The appellate court described this mistake as 
“the kind of error that undermines the fairness of the judicial process.”275 
These instances are of the sort that draw attention: memory loss, difficulty 
speaking, noticeable lapse in concentration. But some symptoms of cognitive 
decline are subtler and perhaps more pernicious.276 For instance, trial judges 
must make hundreds of quick decisions about evidentiary objections, motions, 
and courtroom order.277 At the trial court level, where a number of discretionary 
decisions are made and never reviewed, it would be problematic if judges are 
not as sharp as we want them to be.278 
Yet systemic data about judicial cognitive decline does not exist, and there 
are many examples where informal policing of judicial decline works.279 The 
Breyer report noted the following report from a chief judge: 
I did face problems of the aging process, that’s the most difficult by far to 
deal with . . . . In most cases, the judge recognized it and got off the bench. But 
not in all cases. I talked to family members. I got them to approach the judge. 
You can’t slap a formal complaint at the end of his career on an 83-year old 
judge who has rendered distinguished service . . . . I tried to approach that with 
great delicacy, through family members.280  
The anecdotal evidence suggests that informal methods can work, but not 
always, and that there is much variation from judge to judge.281 It seems likely 
that informal conversations are often hampered by a lack of objective data with 
which to present to the allegedly incompetent judge. 
b. Judicial Wellness 
Some courts have recently begun to promote judicial wellness and make 
readily available to judges resources for brain health.282 The Ninth Circuit was 
the first to establish procedures for providing education and counseling to judges 
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on the possibility of mental decline and other matters.283 Similar Wellness 
Committees have now been established in the First, Third, Fifth, and Tenth 
Circuits.284 In response to inquiries from the non-profit advocacy organization, 
Fix the Court, many of these circuits noted that they are specifically focused on 
issues related to aging judges.285 
In describing the rationale for the Wellness Committee, Ninth Circuit Chief 
Judge Phyllis Hamilton observed: “‘We’re an organization that is required to 
police ourselves . . . If we wish to retain the goodwill and confidence of the 
public in our ability to render justice by judges who are unimpaired . . . we have 
to take steps.’”286 
The Wellness Committee provides assistance and resources to struggling 
jurists.287 The Wellness Committee has also made a Wellness Guide, now in its 
fourth edition, accessible to the entire federal judiciary.288 The Wellness Guide 
has a recommended list of steps for jurists to take when they begin to suspect 
potential issues in a colleague’s ability to perform his/her duties due to mental 
and/or physical impairment.289 These steps, broadly, are divided into 
Recognition, Evaluation, Response, Case Management, and Communications 
and Public Relations.290 The guide also provides a dedicated section on aging 
and problems associated with it (e.g., Alzheimer’s), as well as articles and 
resources on aging.291 
There is limited evidence to suggest that judges have used Wellness 
Committee resources.292 Calls to the Ninth Circuit’s judicial counseling hotline 
were reported to fall into three categories:  
Most are from chief judges seeking advice on how to deal with a judge or staff 
member whose behavior has been problematic or whose health threatens 
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performance. A second group of calls are from senior judges or their families, 
seeking either information on dealing with chronic illness or, as to judges still 
able to perform useful judicial work, on alternative living arrangements 
because they can no longer live in their homes without assistance. A third group 
of calls come from judges seeking some sort of treatment program to help deal 
with a family or personal problem, such as marital conflict.293 
In sum, Wellness Committees could be a useful advance in addressing 
judicial cognitive health.294 But, like other informal mechanisms, they 
ultimately rely upon the judge’s own initiative and self-awareness to be 
effective. As Atkinson observes based on his historical survey, “there is really 
nothing the Court collectively can do to remove a colleague who is not amenable 
to peer group pressure.”295 
* * * 
The federal judiciary has put in place several formal mechanisms to address 
the issue of judicial cognitive decline.296 But the system still primarily relies on 
informal mechanisms, now bolstered by wellness committees in many 
circuits.297 The available evidence is incomplete, but it suggests that informal 
approaches are not always successful in effectively identifying and removing 
judges whose mental faculties are declining.298 This raises the question of 
whether another system would be better in its place. The alternative often 
suggested by commentators, and adopted by a majority of the states, is to 
implement a mandatory judicial retirement age.299 In the next Part, I argue that 
the mandatory retirement age is an inefficient and inequitable solution. 
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V. MANDATORY RETIREMENT AGES FOR JUDGES AS AN INEFFICIENT 
SOLUTION TO JUDICIAL COGNITIVE DECLINE 
Longstanding debates continue about the value of mandatory judicial 
retirement, at both the federal and state levels.300 Many of the critiques and 
justifications are not directly related to the cognitive ability of the judges.301 
Older judges are different from younger judges in many ways other than 
cognitive ability.302 For instance: older judges grew up in a different culture, 
and may judge with different cultural sensitivities than younger judges; older 
judges are more distant in age from more youthful parties appearing in court; 
and older judges, as a cohort, are less diverse along a variety of dimensions than 
cohorts of younger judges.303 Here, I set aside those justifications for mandatory 
retirement and focus narrowly on evaluating mandatory retirement ages with 
respect to ensuring brain health in the judiciary. 
Thirty-two states and the District of Columbia have implemented 
mandatory retirement ages for their judges,304 with eighteen states lacking 
mandatory retirement ages.305 Appendix Table A1 provides a state-by-state 
listing of the mandated judicial retirement age.306 Mandatory retirement ages 
generally range from 70 to 75 years of age.307  
Part A briefly summarizes the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and 
constitutional challenges to state judicial mandatory retirement provisions. Part 
B describes efforts to introduce mandatory retirement ages at the federal level. 
                                                                                                                     
 300 See, e.g., id. (summarizing both sides of the debate on mandatory judicial retirement). 
These debates often overlap with debates over judicial term limits. See, e.g., Judith Resnick, 
Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life Tenure, 26 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 579, 580 (2005).  
 301 See, e.g., Christopher R. McFadden, Judicial Independence, Age-Based BFOQs, and 
the Perils of Mandatory Retirement Policies for Appointed State Judges, 52 S.C. L. REV. 81, 
111 (2000) (noting that many support mandatory retirement because it might make the bench 
younger and more diverse). 
 302 See id. (arguing that removing elderly judges could result in less ideological diversity 
on the bench). 
 303 See Theresa M. Beiner, The Elusive (but Worthwhile) Quest for a Diverse Bench in 
the New Millennium, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 597, 598–99 (2002) (arguing that racial and 
gender diversity on the bench helps to challenge the status quo); McFadden, supra note 301, 
at 111–12 (noting that census data suggests “that mandatory retirement ages will likely 
remove seasoned minority and women judges from the bench prematurely”); Malia Reddick 
et al., Racial and Gender Diversity on State Courts: An AJS Study, 48 JUDGES’ J. 28, 29 
(2009) (arguing that mandatory retirement ages disadvantage female and minority judges). 
 304 Raftery, supra note 299. 
 305 Most States Require Judges to Step Down After 70, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., https:// 
www.ncsc.org/Newsroom/Backgrounder/2010/Mandatory-Retirement.aspx [https://per 
ma.cc/8XQ3-93NB]. These states are Arkansas, California, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, 
Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and West Virginia. Id. 
 306 See SHEN, APPENDIX, supra note 57. 
 307 Id.  
276 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:2 
Part C critiques mandatory judicial retirement ages as out of step with current 
scientific understanding of the aging brain.  
A. Legal Challenges to State Mandated Judicial Retirement Age 
Mandatory retirement became prominent in American society in late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.308 The question of mandatory 
retirement in the United States continued to be debated in the 1950s,309 but by 
the 1960s and 1970s, many older adults worked in industries with mandatory 
retirement ages.310 
In response, Congress, through the Civil Rights Act of 1964, directed the 
Secretary of Labor to “make a full and complete study of the factors which might 
tend to result in discrimination in employment because of age and of the 
consequences of such discrimination on the economy and the individuals 
affected.”311 In 1967, Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act, in which “individuals who [were] between 40 and 65 years of age [were to 
be protected] from discrimination in employment.”312 By 1978, Congress had 
“outlawed mandatory retirement before the age of 70” through the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978 (ADEA).313 Through 
the ADEA, Congress also “rais[ed] the private-sector age of coverage from 65 
to 70 and remove[d] the age cap for federal employees to cover individuals age 
40 and older.”314 Eventually, the age of coverage cap at 70 was also removed 
with the Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986,315 
“abolish[ing] [mandatory retirement] altogether.”316 
                                                                                                                     
 308 Carole Haber, Mandatory Retirement in Nineteenth-Century America: The 
Conceptual Basis for a New Work Cycle, 12 J. SOC. HIST. 77, 81 (1978). According to 
historian Carole Haber, “retirement is a relatively new development in American society,” 
with the period of the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century representing a 
turning point in the “prescribed roles for the old.” Id. at 77. 
 309 See generally Stanley C. Hope, Should There Be a Fixed Retirement Age? Some 
Managements Say Yes, 279 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 72 (1952) (listing the 
advantages of mandatory retirement from the perspective of employees, management, and 
other 1950s stakeholders). 
 310 See Till Von Wachter, The End of Mandatory Retirement in the US: Effects on 
Retirement and Implicit Contracts 1 (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Ctr. for Labor Econs., Working 
Paper No. 49, 2002) (noting that in the 1960s and 1970s, 40% to 50% of the population 
worked in industries with mandatory retirement ages).  
 311 ADEA and Amendments, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/adea50th/adea.cfm [https://perma.cc/YQ7W-YMEL] 
(quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 715, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 265 (July 2, 
1964)). 
 312 Id. (alteration added). 
 313 Von Wachter, supra note 310, at 1.  
 314 ADEA and Amendments, supra note 311 (alterations added).  
 315 Id. 
 316 Von Wachter, supra note 310, at 1. The 1986 ADEA “provide[d] an exemption 
through 1993 for state and local governments using maximum hiring or mandatory 
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Until the Supreme Court ruled on the issue in 1991, there was considerable 
debate about whether a state’s imposition of a mandatory retirement age for 
judges violated the ADEA.317 But in Gregory v. Ashcroft, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that Missouri’s mandatory judicial retirement age of 70 violated 
neither the ADEA nor the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.318  
In Gregory, Justice O’Connor recognized the “authority of the people of the 
States to determine the qualifications of their most important government 
officials.”319 Since older adults are not a “suspect class” of individuals, the 
heightened standard of “strict scrutiny” was not required.320  
Since Gregory v. Ashcroft, there have been periodic calls for raising the 
mandatory retirement age for judges,321 and in recent years, some states have 
explored raising the age.322 There have also been renewed attempts to challenge 
state mandatory retirement laws. In 2016, Minnesota Judge Galen Vaa 
challenged the constitutionality of Minnesota’s mandatory judicial retirement 
                                                                                                                     
retirement ages for firefighters or law enforcement officials.” ADEA and Amendments, supra 
note 311 (also providing an exemption for colleges and universities “who may involuntarily 
retire professors at age 70, if the professor is serving under a contract of unlimited tenure”). 
Over a decade later, the Higher Education Amendments of 1998 amended Section 4 of the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act in order to “permit colleges and universities to offer 
special age-based retirement incentives for tenured faculty members at institutions of higher 
education.” Id. 
 317 See, e.g., Alan L. Bushlow, Note, Mandatory Retirement of State-Appointed Judges 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 476, 478 (1991); 
Thomas Alden Hauser, Note, Mandatory Retirement of State Judges and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 973, 994 (1990); McFadden, supra 
note 301, at 134; Laura A. Popovitch, Comment, EEOC v. State of Vermont: Are Appointed 
State Judges “Employees” under the ADEA?, 20 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 698 (1990); Tina 
E. Sciocchetti, Comment, Mandatory Retirement of Appointed State Judges—Age 
Discrimination?, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 866, 869 (1991); Darlene M. Severson, Note, Mandatory 
Retirement of Judges: Law and Policy—Gregory v. Ashcroft, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
858, 859 (1991); Lawrence A. Walke, Comment, Extending Protection under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act to Appointed State Judges, EEOC v. State of Vermont, 
904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990), 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 359, 359 (1991).  
 318 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991). 
 319 Id. at 463, 472 (“The people of Missouri have a legitimate, indeed compelling, 
interest in maintaining a judiciary fully capable of performing the demanding tasks that 
judges must perform. It is an unfortunate fact of life that physical and mental capacity 
sometimes diminish with age. The people may therefore wish to replace some older judges. 
Voluntary retirement will not always be sufficient. Nor may impeachment—with its public 
humiliation and elaborate procedural machinery—serve acceptably the goal of a fully 
functioning judiciary.”). 
 320 Id. at 470. 
 321 See, e.g., Scott Makar, In Praise of Older Judges: Raise the Mandatory Retirement 
Age?, 71 FLA. B.J. 48, 48 (1997). 
 322 See, e.g., Gen. Assemb. Con. Res. No. 122, 218th Leg. (N.J. 2018). 
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age of 70,323 but the State’s motion to dismiss was granted and his appeal 
denied.324 
In 2018, Michigan Judge Michael Theile argued that Michigan’s 
constitutional requirement that judges not be elected after age 70 violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.325  
The district court, despite finding against him, was sympathetic: “In his 
complaint and in the brief filed in support of his motion for summary judgment, 
plaintiff argues eloquently that age-based classifications such as this are 
irrational.”326 A three-judge panel on the Sixth Circuit was also sympathetic to 
Theile’s argument, stating: “One may well sympathize with Theile’s assertions 
that the age 70 limit is ‘archaic,’ and that ‘it is wrong indiscriminately to put 
people to pasture.’”327 But the court went on to note that “[r]ational basis review 
does not assess the wisdom of the challenged regulation.”328 A Sixth Circuit 
decision eighteen years earlier had previously found Michigan’s judicial age 
limit rationally related to many purposes, including “preserving the competency 
of the judiciary” and “promoting judicial efficiency and reducing partisan 
appointments of judges.”329 The Sixth Circuit did not agree with Theile’s 
argument that “the laws and facts have changed so significantly in the decades 
since” that the previous reasoning was now unsound.330  
B. Efforts to Implement a Mandatory Retirement Age for Federal 
Judges 
Although unsuccessful, there have been multiple attempts to legislate 
mandatory retirement ages for federal judges.331 As former Chief Justice of 
                                                                                                                     
 323 Vaa v. State, No. A17-0489, 2017 WL 3974321, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 
2017). 
 324 Id. at *4. 
 325 Theile v. Michigan, 891 F.3d 240, 242 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Breck v. Michigan, 203 
F.3d 392, 395 (6th Cir. 2000)). 
 326 Theile v. Michigan, No. 17-CV-12066, 2017 WL 6504009, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 4, 
2017), aff’d, 891 F.3d 240 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 327 Theile, 891 F.3d at 244. 
 328 Id. (quoting Breck, 203 F.3d at 395). 
 329 Breck, 203 F.3d at 397. 
 330 Theile, 891 F.3d at 245. 
 331 See Garrow, supra note 245, at 996 (noting that there have been “three different 
occasions over the past sixty-five years” on which members of Congress have attempted to 
institute mandatory judicial retirement ages); see also Robert Kramer & Jerome A. Barron, 
The Constitutionality of Removal and Mandatory Retirement Procedures for the Federal 
Judiciary: The Meaning of “During Good Behavior,” 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 467–71 
(1967) (discussing the constitutionality of mandatory retirement for federal judges). Many 
have also proposed reforms that would eliminate life tenure and replace it with term limits. 
See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Reforming the Supreme Court: An 
Introduction, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 11 
(Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006) (providing an overview of various 
arguments); see also Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 268, at 772 (proposing an eighteen-
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Texas Robert W. Calvert once noted, “[T]here is no sound basis for concluding 
that state judges age, become tired and grow out-of-touch, but that federal 
judges do not.”332 David Garrow provides a detailed history of these efforts at 
imposing a federal mandatory retirement age, noting that “on three different 
occasions over the past sixty-five years, members of Congress have surmounted 
conventional wisdom and confronted the danger of mental decrepitude[.]”333 I 
mention here only some of the key moments. 
In the late 1940s, the American Bar Association (ABA) led an effort to 
galvanize support for mandatory judicial retirement at age 75.334 In 1954, 
through the sponsorship of Maryland Senator John Marshall Butler, the issue 
was debated on the Senate Floor.335 “Butler explained that ‘[i]t is the consensus 
of authoritative opinion that some limit should be placed on service and that the 
age of 75 strikes the happy medium between experience and senility.’”336 The 
amendment passed the Senate but died in the House Judiciary Committee.337 
In 1965, the ABA again offered recommendations to explore “compulsory 
retirement of judges with permanent physical or mental disabilities.”338 The 
ABA worked with Maryland Democratic Senator Joseph D. Tydings in 1968 
and 1969 to advance legislation.339 The issue arose again in the mid-1970s when 
Georgia Senator Sam Nunn took up the mantle and proposed legislation that 
would have provided mandatory retirement ages for all federal judges, including 
the Supreme Court.340 Notably: 
                                                                                                                     
year term limit on Supreme Court justices); James E. DiTullio & John B. Schochet, Saving 
this Honorable Court: A Proposal to Replace Life Tenure on the Supreme Court with 
Staggered, Nonrenewable Eighteen-Year Terms, 90 VA. L. REV. 1093, 1096–97 (2004) 
(arguing that eighteen-year term limits on Supreme Court justices would limit the 
politicization of the Court while preserving judicial independence). 
 332 Garrow, supra note 245, at 1058. 
 333 Id. at 996. 
 334 Id. at 1031–32 (“The measure’s proponents were undaunted, and in mid-December 
the New York City Bar committee sponsored a speech endorsing its proposals by retired 
Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts. Justice Roberts’s speech was published as the lead 
article in the very next month’s American Bar Association Journal, and thereby gave the 
proposals far and away the widest publicity they had yet received. Regarding mandatory 
retirement at age seventy-five, Roberts called it ‘a wise provision. First of all, it will forestall 
the basis of the last attack on the Court, the extreme age of the justices, and the fact that 
superannuated old gentlemen hung on there long after their usefulness had ceased.’”). 
 335 Id. at 1034, 1037.  
 336 Id. at 1040. 
 337 Id. at 1041. 
 338 Report of the Standing Committee on Judicial Selection, Tenure and Compensation, 
90 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 446, 446–47 (1966); Report of the Section of Judicial Administration, 
90 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 587, 587–88 (1966). 
 339 Garrow, supra note 245, at 1057.  
 340 Id. at 1059 (“[I]n October 1974 . . . Georgia Democratic Senator Sam Nunn 
introduced a bill that expanded upon Tydings’s 1969 measure to include Supreme Court 
justices as well. Nunn reintroduced his bill as S 1110 in the new Congress in March 1975, 
and the very next day Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and the United States Judicial 
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Nunn’s bill specifically proposed that for any federal judge or justice who was 
eligible for retirement . . . if a majority of the Judicial Conference found “that 
such Justice or judge is unable to discharge efficiently one or more of the 
critical duties of his office by reason of a permanent mental or physical 
disability, the Conference shall certify the disability of such Justice or judge 
and issue an order removing such Justice or judge from active 
service . . . . Such Justice or judge shall then be involuntarily retired from 
regular active service.”341  
But Senator Nunn’s efforts ultimately failed as well.342 
C. Mandatory Judicial Retirement Ages and Cognitive Decline 
With regard to cognitive decline, the fundamental arguments against 
mandatory judicial retirement ages, both of which were made by Judge Theile 
in his 2018 Michigan challenge, are that (1) some of the judges younger than 
the retirement age may be in decline, and there is little protection against 
cognitive decline prior to the retirement age; and (2) some of the judges older 
than the retirement age are not experiencing cognitive decline and have no 
opportunity to rebut the presumption that they are mentally unfit to serve.343 
There is no access to systematic judicial health data, so analysis remains 
necessarily speculative. 
It is also important to note that there is some evidence suggesting that 
experience on the bench improves judging outcomes,344 and that “judges who 
last longer on the job tend to be better than those who retire earlier.”345 
                                                                                                                     
Conference announced their support for a somewhat narrower approach that would police 
‘mental disability’ and other shortcomings among lower federal court judges but would not 
cover justices of the Supreme Court.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 341 Id. at 1059–60 (quoting 121 CONG. REC. 5609, 5721 (1975)). 
 342 Id. at 1065 (“From the perspective of the Supreme Court’s extensive history with 
mentally decrepit justices, Senator Nunn’s well intentioned but constitutionally questionable 
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 343 See “Corrected” Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at *23–28, Theile v. Michigan, 891 F.3d 
240 (6th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-2275), 2017 WL 6210343. Theile phrased his argument as 
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Id.  
 344 See Benjamin Iverson et al., Learning by Doing: Judge Experience and Bankruptcy 
Outcomes 7 (Nov. 14, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (noting that 
judicial experience “play[s] an important role in determining large Chapter 11 [bankruptcy] 
outcomes”). 
 345 Elliott Ash & Bentley MacLeod, Aging, Retirement, and High-Skill Work 
Performance: The Case of State Supreme Court Judges 41 (Dec. 18, 2017) (unpublished 
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To start, there is no published neuroscientific research suggesting that a 
particular age (sixty, sixty-five, seventy-five, and so on) should serve as the 
bright line cutoff for cognitive decline.346 In fact, the literature is clear that at 
older ages there is wider individual variation in cognitive abilities.347 Notably, 
there are some fifty-year-olds who perform worse than some eighty-year-olds 
(and vice versa).348 Bright line age rules are not sensitive to such variation. 
An additional concern is that the correlation between age and the judicial 
functional capacity is not clear, even at a group average level.349 Atkinson is 
right that “whether a justice should retire at age sixty-five or seventy or seventy-
five does not satisfactorily resolve the basic issue of competence.”350 Certainly, 
as I discussed above, there are many anecdotes of older judges displaying 
worrisome cognitive decline.351 But we could also fill pages with anecdotes of 
older judges performing their duties wonderfully.352 
One example is legendary U.S. District Judge Jack Weinstein.353 At age 
ninety-six, Judge Weinstein is still productive and writing notable opinions.354 
He annually undergoes a neurological evaluation,355 and observes that “[m]y 
memory is not as acute as it was, [but] principles, I know, and my judgment is 
the same—it may be better.”356 A bright line rule of mandatory retirement at 
age seventy-five would have deprived the country of the past twenty years of 
Judge Weinstein’s opinions.  
Another way in which mandatory retirement ages are at odds with 
neuroscience research is the gender-uniformity of the age cut-offs. There is 
                                                                                                                     
manuscript) (on file with author). However, it is unclear how the quality of opinions varies 
with age, as different outcome measures produce different results. See id. at 3–4 (noting that 
quantifiable judicial outputs are affected by “many factors external to the judge”). 
 346 See Rogalski et al., supra note 107, at 30 (noting that many individuals over the age 
of eighty retain cognitive abilities comparable to individuals in their fifties or sixties). 
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 348 Id. (“Increase in the magnitude of interindividual variation in memory performance 
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 349 See Ash & MacLeod, supra note 345, at 4 (noting that older judges typically write 
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 350 ATKINSON, supra note 246, at 168. 
 351 See supra Part IV.B. 
 352 See, e.g., Alan Feuer, The 96-Year-Old Brooklyn Judge Standing Up to the Supreme 
Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/nyregion/the-
96-year-old-brooklyn-judge-standing-up-to-the-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc 
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 353 Id. 
 354 Id. 
 355 Life Tenure for Federal Judges, supra note 4 (“Judge Weinstein of Brooklyn gets an 
annual neurological checkup, including a CAT scan.”). 
 356 Id. (alterations in original).  
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growing evidence that female brains age at a different rate than male brains.357 
Although it is not yet entirely clear what explains these differences, the evidence 
suggest that “throughout the adult life span the typical female brain is more 
youthful.”358 Mandatory retirement is perhaps not only ageist, but also sexist in 
its lack of recognition that older female judges may, on average, have more 
youthful brains than their male colleagues.359 
Finally, in addition to concerns that a bright-line rule excludes older judges 
who would still perform very well on the bench, there is a parallel concern that 
the bright-line approach doesn’t solve the issue of cognitive decline before the 
mandatory retirement age. Consider the following anecdote. 
In Chicago in 2016, fifty-nine-year-old Cook County Judge Valarie Turner 
made local headlines for erratic behavior in her courtroom.360 Judge Turner had 
a tremendous legal pedigree: she was a graduate of the University of Chicago 
and worked at Kirkland & Ellis before joining the bench in 2002.361 But in the 
summer of 2016, she exhibited erratic behavior in chambers.362 Most notably, 
she allowed an attorney to wear the judicial robe and preside over cases.363 
Immediately after this incident, the chief judge in the county removed her from 
the bench.364 She subsequently underwent medical evaluations, and was 
diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease.365 Mandatory retirement ages do little to 
address situations such as Judge Turner’s, when cognitive decline happens 
before the mandatory retirement age. 
Moreover, this case raises an important point about the need for dignified 
procedures. The Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board found Judge Turner “mentally 
unable” to do her work, and when the Board filed a formal complaint to the 
Illinois Courts Commission, her attorney was critical.366 In the attorney’s view: 
Ms. Turner is charged with no misconduct. She therefore has done nothing that 
would justify any sanction that could be imposed by the commission. In 
                                                                                                                     
 357 See Manu S. Goyal et al., Persistent Metabolic Youth in the Aging Female Brain, 116 
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essence, the Judicial Inquiry Board has charged her only with having 
Alzheimer’s disease. This sets a terrible precedent for any judge who, like Ms. 
Turner, has an illness that she did not cause and cannot control.367  
The attorney’s critique highlights the lack of support structures and 
procedures for handling cognitive decline and raises fundamental questions 
about the fairness of using judicial misconduct mechanisms to address age-
related cognitive decline in judges. 
* * * 
Mandatory retirement ages for judges may serve other useful purposes, but 
they are a suboptimal solution for responding to age-related cognitive decline. 
The nature and rate of change in cognitive abilities vary significantly across 
individuals, and this variation is not accounted for in systems that rely entirely 
on mandatory retirement ages as the bulwark against dementia on the bench. As 
I will discuss in the next Part, the introduction of individualized cognitive 
assessment offers a more promising alternative.  
VI. A PATH FORWARD: TOWARD INDIVIDUALIZED ASSESSMENT OF 
JUDICIAL COGNITIVE CAPACITY 
This Part lays out a vision for the development of a judicial cognitive 
assessment toolbox for judges. Before making my affirmative proposal, I 
emphasize three things that I am not proposing.  
First, I am not arguing that the federal system should adopt the proposed 
cognitive assessment as a screening device. Indeed, I emphasize that the results 
of the assessment should not be shared with anyone other than the judge. My 
proposal is that the cognitive assessment be integrated into the existing federal 
system. Second, and relatedly, I am not arguing that a single brain scan should 
be dispositive of a judge’s future on the bench. Neuroimaging should be 
included in the toolbox of assessment tools, but the translation of biomarkers 
into judicial functional capacity requires careful consideration of many 
behavioral data points in addition to the brain imaging. Third, I am not 
suggesting that implementation of these tools should happen immediately. I 
suggest instead that the development of a judicial capacity evaluation system 
must be carried out with great care. The most immediate next step should be the 
development of an interdisciplinary research group to produce a consensus 
report on best practices and best tools to employ for assessing judicial cognitive 
health. 
Part A frames the discussion by gleaning lessons from the development of 
regulations for cognitive testing for commercial airline pilots and for aging 
physicians. Part B then transitions to law, laying out some basic principles that 
the testing should accomplish. Part C reviews a variety of neuropsychological 
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tests that may be of use. Part D discusses emerging neuroscientific biomarkers 
for Alzheimer’s. Part E presents a plan for development and implementation of 
a judicial capacity toolbox. I emphasize the need for input across disciplines and 
stakeholders in developing this toolbox.  
A. Learning from Similar Contexts in Other Professions 
Judges are not the only professionals who are aging and confronting the 
possibility of cognitive testing. In crafting a solution for judges, I start by 
reviewing what can be learned from the experiences of airline pilots and 
physicians. What can be seen in both instances is that resistance to an 
individualized testing regime is rooted in a concern that the proper testing 
tool/technology for individualized assessment does not exist. 
1. Aging Airline Pilots 
My proposed solution below draws upon wisdom generated by the airline 
pilot screening program implemented via federal law. In 1958, Congress passed 
the “Federal Aviation Act,” directing the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) to (amongst other things) consider “the duty of an air carrier to provide 
service with the highest possible degree of safety” when issuing an airman 
certificate, air carrier certificate, or other certificate.368 In 1959, the FAA 
subsequently set the “Age 60 Rule,”369 which stated that “an airline pilot, at the 
age of 60, must discontinue flying aircraft used to carry passengers in airline 
operations.”370 This meant that “an airline pilot who reaches the age of 60 must 
retire without regard to his or her excellent health and continued ability to 
fly.”371 In generating the rule, the FAA noted that “available medical studies 
show that sudden incapacitation due to heart attacks or strokes becomes more 
frequent as men approach age sixty and present medical knowledge is such that 
it is impossible to predict with accuracy those individuals most likely to suffer 
attacks.”372 The age restriction was quickly challenged, with the plaintiff pilots 
arguing that “the age sixty limitation is arbitrary and discriminatory and without 
relation to any requirements of safety.”373 But the Second Circuit found that the 
age of 60 was reasonable, given the available evidence.374  
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The Age 60 Rule has been challenged on other occasions.375 In 1970, the 
Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) requested that the FAA revoke the Age 60 
Rule, and instead replace it with individualized tests of performance.376 The 
FAA decided to retain the Age 60 Rule, and again a court challenge failed 
because the FAA’s rulemaking was deemed reasonable given the available 
evidence.377 
There were two justifications for the Age 60 Rule. The first was that pilots 
might be more likely to die suddenly while controlling the plane in flight.378 
That is not relevant to the judiciary concern—a judge who dies in the middle of 
a trial may cause trauma to those who witness it, but the legal machinery is in 
place to readily keep proceedings moving at a future date.379 The second 
concern for pilots, however, is closely tied to the judicial concern: through an 
“increased probability of subtle incapacitation that would lead to errors or 
slowing in perceptual, cognitive, and psychomotor function, and thus 
compromise safe pilot performance.”380 
The Age 60 Rule was again scrutinized in 1979, when Congress directed 
the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and in turn the National Academies, to 
examine whether age 60 was an appropriate cut-off age.381 I offer a close 
examination of this National Academies Report because it serves as a useful 
model for the careful, interdisciplinary research required to develop a new 
toolbox on judicial cognitive aging. The preface to the National Academies 
Report frames the issue well: 
In the 21 years since the regulation was adopted, it has been repeatedly 
challenged as unjustified. Those in favor of the rule, however, contend that 
persons whose jobs directly involve the public safety, such as airline pilots, bus 
drivers, firemen, and air traffic controllers bear the burden of proving that 
increasing their retirement age will not jeopardize the public safety.382 
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The National Academies report found that “[f]or significant acute events 
(such as cardiovascular events and stroke), age 60 does not mark the beginning 
of a special risk or a special increase in risk,”383 but also that “[a]vailable 
evidence suggests that on the average at least some of the skills necessary for 
the highest level of safety deteriorate with age” and that “there is great variation 
among individuals in any age group.”384 
In the end, the National Academies took a middle position. On one hand, it 
was clear that “[i]n its assessment of relevant biomedical and behavioral 
research, the committee found that variability within an age group is often nearly 
as great as variability among age groups, and that usually no single age emerges 
as a point of sharp decline in function.”385 On the other hand, however, it 
recognized that individual tests to determine functional capacity were not 
readily available.386 Ultimately the report concluded that a new test was needed, 
and that an optimal test would examine functional capacity, in order to “detect 
changes in performance that are operationally significant and may be more 
likely to occur among older pilots[.]”387 
The issue of individualized testing arose again in the early 1980s.388 At that 
time, the FAA considered a temporary modification to the Rule, in which pilots 
over age sixty would be allowed to fly in order that the FAA could collect data 
on this new cohort—and thus determine if risks increased after age sixty.389 The 
FAA decided not to pursue this modified rule, however, largely based on the 
perceived inability to conduct accurate individual-level assessment of functional 
capacity.390 The FAA wrote that: 
There simply are insufficient means of accurately testing whether 
individual pilots will become incapacitated to gather data sufficient to support 
a determination on the age 60 rule. As the Medical Director of a large aerospace 
firm states: “Until more precise methods of detecting physiological changes 
brought on by aging are developed, no program of data gathering or physical 
examination will provide meaningful information.”391 
In the early 1990s, the same cycle repeated itself. This time, a new study 
found that there was “no hint of an increase in the accident rate for pilots of 
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scheduled air carriers as they near their 60th birthday.”392 The FAA held public 
hearings, but in 1995 decided to stick with the Age 60 Rule, concluding that 
“[a]fter considering all comments and known studies, FAA concludes that 
concerns regarding aging pilots and underlying the original rule have not been 
shown to be invalid or misplaced.”393 Subsequent further legal challenges, on 
the basis of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) also failed.394  
Failing to generate change via agency rulemaking and the courts, lobbyists 
and interest groups turned their attention to Congress. In 2007, Congress passed 
the Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act, which stated that “a pilot may 
serve in multicrew covered operations until attaining 65 years of age.”395 While 
advocates applauded the change, it didn’t address the lingering question of 
individual capacity.396 As one commenter on the Act remarked, a retirement age 
of sixty-five is “just as arbitrary as age sixty.”397 Thus, although the age was 
raised for airline pilots, the idea of assessing functional capacity on an individual 
level was tabled. 
2. Aging Physicians 
Similar to judges, doctors in America are getting older, and many are no 
longer retiring at the traditional age of sixty-five.398 There is also evidence 
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suggesting that cognitive impairment is likely for some older physicians.399 
Thus, physicians find themselves in a similar situation as judges; no mandatory 
retirement for a growing number of older physicians400—some of whom very 
likely are experiencing cognitive decline that may affect their performance.  
The medical community is actively debating whether informal mechanisms 
of policing are sufficient.401 It has been found that “adaptive thinking and 
critical reasoning,” “processing speed,” “episodic memory,” “hearing, visual 
acuity, depth perception, colour discrimination and manual dexterity” are all 
“age-related sensory and cognitive changes” that affect the aging process, and 
work, of doctors.402 “Skill, ability to discern and memory” are crucial tools for 
surgeons throughout their careers, but they all tend to deteriorate with age.403 
One of the concerns is that the evidence suggests that physicians’ self-
evaluations of their skills may overestimate their competence as compared to 
objective testing.404  
In June 2018, a group of physicians published an article that drew 
considerable attention: Cognitively Impaired Physicians: How Do We Detect 
Them? How Do We Assist Them?405 The authors made a series of observations 
similar to those made about judges: 
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 There are more older physicians: “Many physicians continue to practice 
into their 70s and 80s as a consequence of professional satisfaction, 
increased life expectancy, concerns regarding financial security, and 
reluctance to retire.”406 
 There are benefits from experience: “[A] physician’s effectiveness can 
be enhanced through acquisition and refinement of experience, 
knowledge, patient management skills, and clinical judgment.”407 
 There are also, on average, age-related deficits: “In physicians as in all 
adults, cognitive decline is acknowledged to be a consequence of aging. 
Extensive evidence documents age-associated neuropathologic brain 
changes that are manifested in cognitive changes . . . Aging affects 
multiple domains of cognitive functioning relevant to physicians’ 
professional performance.”408 
Faced with this new landscape, a number of physicians are now advocating 
for more regular competence testing.409 The American College of Emergency 
Physicians (ACEP) has pursued the “concept of senior career development.”410 
In 2009, the ACEP Board of Directors approved a set of guidelines that were 
developed to “enhance and prolong the careers of emergency physicians in the 
latter stages of their professional lives, to ensure patient safety, to promote 
continued membership and participation in the College, and to facilitate the 
transition of emergency physicians from active practice to semi- or full 
retirement.”411 
The American College of Surgeons in 2016 issued a “Statement on the 
Aging Surgeon,” and in that statement “recommended that, starting at age 65 to 
70, surgeons undergo voluntary and confidential baseline physical examination 
and visual testing by their personal physician for overall health assessment.”412  
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Some hospital systems have even implemented such testing for the 
physicians within their system.413 In 2012, Stanford University Medical Center 
rolled out a “compulsory . . . physical examination [every two years], cognitive 
screening and peer assessment of clinical performance for all physicians aged 
75 years.”414 The inclusion of the peer assessment component in the 
examination is significant for the cultural and professional precedents it was 
based on; peer assessments have been common in medicine since the second 
half of the twentieth century, with proven feasibility and efficacy.415 As 
physicians’ and surgeons’ colleagues are those who understand the nature of 
their work best, their opinions on the quality of other doctors’ work, while 
subjective, is an important factor to include in a cognitive assessment. Similarly, 
the University of Virginia has “intermittent assessments of doctors after 70 years 
of age.”416 Beginning in 2014, the Sinai Hospital of Baltimore introduced a 
program to more closely align cognitive evaluations with a discussion on 
retirement; this plan, known as the “Aging Surgeon Program,” is a “2-day 
confidential evaluation of physical and cognitive function for surgeons” which 
can be administered to surgeons other than Sinai Hospital employees, as well.417 
Performing poorly on the program’s evaluations does not lead to mandatory 
retirement, however; it leads to a discussion between the surgeon and their 
hospital, “at which stage the decision to retire would still be with the surgeon, 
unless there has been gross negligence.”418 
It remains to be seen how the regulation of older physicians will develop, 
but the trend is clear: many physicians and the institutions they serve recognize 
that relying upon individual doctors—even with the nudging of their colleagues 
and friends—may not be sufficient. The same can also be said for aging judges. 
B. Judicial Functional Capacity—What’s Required? 
What cognitive abilities are required to discharge efficiently all the duties 
of a judicial office? The answer to this question requires a sustained 
conversation amongst legal stakeholders and experts in science and medicine. 
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Such a working group would need to acknowledge at the outset that this is a 
difficult problem. 
As Charles Geyh has observed from his historical treatment of the topic: 
What to do with an allegedly senile, mentally ill, or otherwise disabled judge 
is an understandably difficult issue that requires . . . [us] to balance the 
conflicting interests of protecting the judicial system from the disabled judge, 
insulating the nondisabled judge from politically motivated efforts at 
neutralization, and preserving the dignity of the now-disabled judge who may 
have served the judiciary long and well.419 
At the heart of the challenge is the translation of a medical diagnosis to a 
legal function. Other areas of policymaking around dementia illustrate how 
difficult this translation can be. For instance, should a diagnosis of early-onset 
Alzheimer’s result in immediate revocation of one’s driver’s license?420 
We know that a disability in and of itself is not disqualifying. There are, for 
instance, judges who are legally blind. In 2014, blind Judge Richard Bernstein 
joined the Michigan Supreme Court.421 Judge David Tatel, on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia, is also blind.422 Just as blind justices can, 
with accommodations, execute their duties faithfully, we need to think carefully 
about how judges exhibiting cognitive decline might still be able to serve on the 
bench. 
To develop an effective tool for assessing capacity in the judicial brain, we 
need to first wrestle with the question: Capacity to do what? It is not enough to 
say that the system cares about something vague such as “how well the judge’s 
brain processes information.” This is because on one hand, older judicial brains 
may process some information less well due to age-related cognitive decline (a 
loss in fluid intelligence).423 But on the other hand, older judicial brains may 
process some information better due to accumulated legal wisdom (a gain in 
crystallized intelligence).424 
Second, the toolbox should allow stakeholders to be proactive and not 
simply reactive. Both the formal and informal mechanisms currently in use rely 
upon the development of symptoms so significant that others in the courthouse 
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notice them.425 The use of sensitive neuropsychological tests and brain 
biomarkers offers the system an opportunity to identify risks in advance.426 
Third, a corollary of an emphasis on prevention is that implementation of 
the system must ensure privacy and dignity for all judges. One way to 
accomplish this is to move away from an all-or-nothing (retire or not) approach, 
in which a judge’s duties can be aligned with their cognitive abilities. For 
instance, a judge might continue to be an excellent resource for certain types of 
cases, but no longer effective as a trial judge. 
With those guiding principles established, we can turn to the specific health 
information and cognitive functions to test. A useful place to start is to ask: What 
health information is already requested from judges, at the nomination stage? 
In the federal system, the form provided to judicial nominees begins with 
the introductory text: “The physical and mental requirements for Judiciary 
appointments are in principle that the appointee is currently capable, and for the 
foreseeable future will be capable of efficient service without evidence of 
mental or emotional instability.”427 
The form later asks the nominee about “progressive neurological disorders,” 
“current emotional or mental instability,” and “any other condition that is 
disabling or potentially disabling in the foreseeable future.”428 Later in the form, 
the medical provider is instructed to check either “Yes” or “No” in answer to 
the question: “Do you find any abnormal condition or disease of . . . [the] brain 
& nervous system?”429 This information is important at the nomination stage 
because it is reasonable to assume that legislators would be hesitant about 
nominating a judge whose cognitive machinery is potentially faulty. If this 
information is relevant at the start of a judge’s career, surely it remains relevant 
later. 
At the state level, judicial nominee questionnaires suggest that health 
information is of paramount importance. Of the twenty-five states who had 
judicial nominee questionnaires available online, eighty percent required some 
form of health or capacity information.430 Most states ask a version of this 
question: “Are you physically and mentally able to perform the essential duties 
of a judge in the court for which you are applying?”431 Some states, such as 
Delaware, ask more probing questions. Delaware’s text reads: 
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Ability to perform the essential functions of a judge means:  
 
(i) The ability to analyze legal issues to reach reasoned legal judgments;  
(ii) The ability to evaluate the credibility of witnesses; 
(iii) The ability to make factual determinations from competing 
presentations;  
(iv) The ability to make decisions in a timely fashion;  
(v) The ability to serve in a fair, impartial, and unbiased manner;  
(vi) The ability to communicate orally and in writing, in an articulate and 
logical manner;  
(vii) The ability to demonstrate honesty, integrity, patience, open-
mindedness, courtesy, tact, compassion, and humility in performing 
judicial functions;  
(viii) The ability to exercise control over court proceedings; and  
(ix) The ability to perform the above functions for a minimum of eight 
hours per day, five days per week (or such other times as Court may 
be in session), on a consistent basis . . . . 
 
. . . Do you currently possess the physical and mental ability to perform 
the essential functions of a judge, with or without a reasonable 
accommodation? . . . 
. . . Are you currently using illegal drugs, or do you habitually use illegal 
drugs on a recreational basis or otherwise? . . . 
. . . Do you frequently fail to take any lawful medications which enable 
you to perform the essential functions of a judge? . . .  
. . . Do you typically consume alcoholic beverages to such an extent that 
your ability to perform the essential functions of a judge is impaired? . . .  
. . . Are you a compulsive gambler, or have you ever been diagnosed or 
received treatment, therapy, or counseling for compulsive gambling?432 
Just as the Delaware questions are grounded in the essential functions of the 
judiciary, so too should the proposed cognitive testing system align with judicial 
function. 
One way to identify the core judicial functions is to examine the 
jurisdiction’s judicial code of conduct.433 Codes of conduct form the basis of 
our expectations for ethical and effective judicial behavior.434 The ABA 
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produced a canon of ethics in 1924,435 and, in the federal system, relevant canons 
from the Code of Conduct for United States Judges include: 
 Canon 1: “A judge should maintain and enforce high standards of 
conduct and should personally observe those standards, so that the 
integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved.”436 
 Canon 2: “A judge should respect and comply with the law and should 
act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. . . . A judge should not allow 
family, social, political, financial, or other relationships to influence 
judicial conduct or judgment.”437 
 Canon 3(A)(1): “A judge should be faithful to, and maintain 
professional competence in, the law and should not be swayed by 
partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.”438 
 Canon 3(A)(3): “A judge should be patient, dignified, respectful, and 
courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom 
the judge deals in an official capacity.”439 
In sum, these codes and our own intuition tell us that a judge must think and 
feel with great integrity, competence, and sensitivity. These abilities—to think, 
to feel, and to interact socially with others—are all a part of what the mind 
sciences refer to as “cognition.”440 
How a judge interprets these canons, of course, is open to much flexibility. 
Temperament varies. Some judges are quieter, some louder, some harsher, some 
more lenient. These and many other variations in judicial temperament are 
typically deemed acceptable. For instance, as Terry Maroney has argued, we are 
often split as to whether we want “angry judges” on the bench.441 While the 
legal community is willing to accept variation in judicial personality,442 there 
are limits to acceptable variation in cognitive ability. The toolbox then must be 
flexible enough to allow for acceptable variation in temperament and intellect. 
In developing the toolbox, the following non-exhaustive list of 
considerations are of import:  
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 What areas of cognition should be the focus of the exam? Existing tools 
are well equipped to be adapted to the legal context, and to explore 
several relevant cognitive areas, including the following: 
o Executive functioning: Judges need to use their executive function 
capabilities extensively, and assessment of executive function must 
thus be a central component of the toolbox.443  
o Memory: Judges need to remember significant amounts of 
information and need to be able to access that information regularly.  
o Emotional Regulation: Judges need to engage with litigants and 
courtroom staff in a professional, respectful manner. To the extent 
that aging affects this ability, emotional capacity should be 
explored. 
 How will we know if a judge has sufficient capacity on selected 
cognitive dimensions? Even if we were to agree on the areas of 
cognition, the system would need to develop thresholds to determine 
judicial capacity. For instance, does a slight decrease in working 
memory speed mean that the chief judge must be alerted?444 These line-
drawing questions will no doubt be thorny. But it is not impossible to 
arrive at a reasonable, widely accepted solution. As discussed above, 
health care systems are already solving this problem in the context of 
aging physicians.445  
 What is the menu of options available for declining judges? Much of 
the literature on judicial retirement has framed the discussion as 
offering a dichotomy: serve on the bench or retire.446 However, there 
are a range of services that judges can provide, and the cognitive skill 
sets required for these services vary across these judges. The system 
should consider, as is being done in the physician context, how skill sets 
(even if in decline) can be matched to meaningful work. 
 Who will administer the system? 
o While the Judicial Conference seems a natural home for the 
administration of this testing regime,447 it would have to coordinate 
with regional health care providers to implement the assessments.  
o To what extent will other agencies be involved in the funding and/or 
administration of the system? 
o Questions of regulatory oversight, agency independence, appeals 
processes, and the like would need to be considered. 
 How can the system ensure privacy and dignity for judges? 
                                                                                                                     
 443 See supra text accompanying note 95. 
 444 See supra text accompanying note 96. 
 445 See supra Part VI.A.2. 
 446 Compare, e.g., Hemel, supra note 5, with Segall, supra note 5. 
 447 This is because the Judicial Conference is the “national policy-making body for the 
federal courts.” Governance and the Judicial Conference, U.S. CTS., http://www.us 
courts.gov/about-federal-courts/governance-judicial-conference [https://perma.cc/9QED 
-ARPA]. 
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o Mandatory assessment of judges introduces many questions of 
information privacy and compliance with relevant privacy laws.  
o In addition, a dignified pathway to retirement must be ensured. For 
instance, judges could be phased out in ways that would allow them 
to keep their health record private.  
 Which stakeholders should play a role in the design of this system? 
Stakeholders whose voices should be heard include: 
o Judges and their families, in both state and federal judiciary systems 
o Judicial Council and state equivalents 
o Litigants 
o Professional associations, e.g., American Bar Association 
o Citizens 
 How often should the assessment be administered? There are a variety 
of options for the timing of the assessment, and discussion can draw on 
relevant medical research related to optimal screening intervals by age. 
These design features would, of course, need to be further worked out. 
Likewise, funding for the program would need to be obtained. But because at 
least some of the costs would be covered by the existing health care plan, cost 
should not be a major stumbling block. Once developed, the system would 
consist of the following components: 
 Specific examination protocols for the initial baseline assessment 
during the nomination process, with clearly established processes for 
communicating incidental findings and possible identification of 
neuropathology to the candidate; 
 Specific examination protocols for follow-up visits (which may vary by 
age and availability of experts); 
 Specific protocols for maintaining privacy of health data; 
 Educational programs, similar to the wellness committees, in each 
jurisdiction to explain the nature and importance of the brain health 
assessment; and 
 System-wide administration to ensure communication and compliance 
with the cognitive health assessment requirement. 
These components can be compiled into a uniform judicial cognitive health 
assessment program that (1) collects baseline neuroimaging and 
neuropsychology data at the nomination stage, and follow-up neuroimaging and 
neuropsychology data in regular five-year intervals thereafter; and (2) requires 
that the results of the testing remain private, with no exceptions unless expressly 
authorized by the judge evaluated. 
Designed this way, the system is more about judicial empowerment than it 
is about judicial reprimand. It mandates the testing, but also mandates the 
privacy of that testing data. The requirements to operate the system are 
attainable: access to experts in relevant fields, and a central administrative office 
to ensure that judges do follow-up testing at the appropriate times and with the 
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appropriate specialists. The toolbox could be readily added to both the federal 
and state systems. 
C. Existing Assessment Tools 
It is premature to select the specific tools that would be used for judicial 
cognitive assessment, but I review a number of potential options in this Section.  
Cognitive testing and screening for dementia are conducted regularly in a 
variety of contexts.448 To facilitate this screening, there are a number of 
cognitive tests for older adults.449 A public health challenge is implementing the 
proper screening tools, and these challenges might similarly arise in the judicial 
screening context. For the public, a fear of stigmatization, a lack of awareness 
of dementia, and a lack of resources (such as cost and time) hinder the 
widespread acceptance of population screening for dementia.450 Another 
hindrance to screening is the lack of a standardized assessment tool to assess 
cognitive functioning and impairment, or the inaccuracy of currently available 
screening tools.451 
Currently, practice guidelines published by the American Academy of 
Neurology (AAN) in 2001 recommend that cognitive impairment be assessed 
using screening instruments and neuropsychology testing batteries, and that 
such assessments may be supplemented with specific cognitive instruments that 
“focus on limited aspects of cognitive function” (such as executive function) 
and informant interviews with individuals close to the patient.452 While the 
AAN mentions specific tools that may be used for screening purposes, such as 
                                                                                                                     
 448 See Henry Brodaty et al., What Is the Best Dementia Screening Instrument for 
General Practitioners to Use?, 14 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 391, 391 (2006) (“The 
detection and early diagnosis of dementia are becoming increasingly important as our 
population ages. . . . Early diagnosis may enable patients to plan for the future while still 
competent, initiate enduring power of attorney and guardianship, address safety concerns 
such as driving ability, and enable caregivers to seek education sooner.”); Jennifer R. Harvan 
& Valerie T. Cotter, An Evaluation of Dementia Screening in the Primary Care Setting, 18 
J. AM. ACAD. NURSE PRACTITIONERS 351, 351–52 (2006) (describing the need for routine 
screening for dementia in elderly populations). 
 449 See generally Stelios Zygouris & Magda Tsolaki, Computerized Cognitive Testing 
for Older Adults: A Review, 30 AM. J. ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE & OTHER DEMENTIAS 13 (2015) 
(analyzing the merits and weaknesses of the different cognitive assessments for elderly 
populations). 
 450 See Steven Martin et al., Attitudes and Preferences Towards Screening for Dementia: 
A Systematic Review of the Literature, 15 BMC GERIATRICS 1, 10 (2015) (“Attitudes and 
preferences [toward wide-spread dementia screening] are complex and multi-factorial and 
our findings suggest that population screening for dementia may be acceptable neither to the 
general public nor to health care professionals.”). 
 451 Id. at 8. 
 452 R.C. Petersen et al., Practice Parameter: Early Detection of Dementia: Mild 
Cognitive Impairment (an Evidence-Based Review): Report of the Quality Standards 
Subcommittee of the American Academy of Neurology, 56 NEUROLOGY 1133, 1139–40 
(2001). 
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the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE),453 a multitude of screening tools 
are being used and developed. 
After its initial development and introduction in 1975, the MMSE has 
become one of the most frequently used cognitive tests for assessing cognitive 
impairment across the world.454 The instrument has been translated and 
empirically validated for use in many different languages and countries,455 and 
certain versions have even been made available for those with disabilities, 
including impaired vision.456 The MMSE consists of “19 individual tests of 11 
domains covering orientation, registration, attention or calculation (serial sevens 
or spelling), recall, naming, repetition, comprehension (verbal and written), 
writing, and construction.”457 The MMSE has historically been used to detect 
whether or not patients have dementia, although in recent years, the test has been 
applied to identify patients with mild cognitive impairment (MCI) as well.458  
Many attempts have been made to empirically validate the diagnostic 
sensitivity (the ability of the instrument to diagnose those with dementia as 
having dementia) and specificity (the ability of the instrument to diagnose those 
without dementia as not having dementia) of the MMSE.459  
One reason why the MMSE may be so widely used is because the score 
results are relatively easy for healthcare professionals to interpret.460 The 
MMSE is championed as the user-friendly test for patients, administrators, and 
evaluators.461 Cut-off scores (or “thresholds”) exist that denote boundaries 
between “normal” cognition and impaired cognition.462 The MMSE is 
                                                                                                                     
 453 Id. at 1138. 
 454 See Alex J. Mitchell, A Meta-Analysis of the Accuracy of the Mini-Mental State 
Examination in the Detection of Dementia and Mild Cognitive Impairment, 43 J. 
PSYCHIATRIC RES. 411, 411 (2009) (“Since [1975 the MMSE] has become widely used and 
highly cited.”). 
 455 See J. Olazarán Rodríguez & F. Bermejo Pareja, There Is No Scientific Basis for 
Retiring the MMSE, 30 NEUROLOGÍA 589, 590 (2015) (noting that the MMSE’s availability 
in “so many languages and countries” is a reason for its widespread popularity). 
 456 See generally Anja Busse et al., Adaptation of Dementia Screening for Vision-
Impaired Older Persons: Administration of the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE), 55 
J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 909 (2002) (analyzing the adaption of the MMSE to visually 
impaired individuals). 
 457 Mitchell, supra note 454, at 411.  
 458 Id. at 412. 
 459 See generally Alex J. Mitchell et al., The Mini-Mental State Examination as a 
Diagnostic and Screening Test for Delirium: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 36 GEN. 
HOSP. PSYCHIATRY 627 (2014) (compiling MMSE sensitivity and specificity data). 
 460 Mitchell, supra note 454, at 412 (describing MMSE scores as “fairly well understood 
by health professionals”). 
 461 See C. Carnero-Pardo, Should the Mini-Mental State Examination Be Retired?, 29 
NEUROLOGÍA 473, 475 (2014) (touting the MMSE as a “user-friendly instrument that can be 
administered and evaluated by non-qualified personnel”). 
 462 Generally, the most accepted cut-off score is around 24. See Patrizio Pezotti et al., 
The Accuracy of the MMSE in Detecting Cognitive Impairment when Administered by 
General Practitioners: A Prospective Observational Study, 9 BMC FAM. PRAC. 1, 3 (2008) 
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deceptively simple, however, because the cut-off thresholds are not necessarily 
clinically significant.463 These and other limitations have resulted in some 
experts calling for the retirement of the MMSE in place of more freely available 
and effective screening tools,464 while other experts argue that it would be more 
efficient to improve the existing scale.465 Support for the use of the MMSE as 
the sole diagnostic criterion is weak.466 In the context of judicial cognitive 
screening, it would be a mistake to simplify a judge’s entire mental capacity into 
a single number or even a single test.  
Developed after the MMSE, the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) 
is a ten-minute cognitive test that consists of eleven tasks designed to address 
the major efficacy limitations of the MMSE.467 Completion of these tasks 
awards the participants points, which are aggregated to produce a score on a 
thirty-point scale.468 A score of at least twenty-six points indicates normal 
cognitive functioning; likewise, a score below twenty-six points indicates some 
degree of cognitive impairment, with lower scores indicating more severe 
impairment.469 
While the MoCA takes slightly longer to administer than the MMSE, the 
MoCA covers more cognitive domains, including additional items that measure 
executive and visuospatial function.470 As such, the MoCA can identify changes 
that are typically not identified by the MMSE.471 For example, the MoCA is 
significantly better at distinguishing MCI from normal age-related decline.472 
                                                                                                                     
(“The total score for the MMSE ranges from 0 to 30; scores > 24 indicate basically no 
cognitive impairment; scores < 18 indicate severe cognitive impairment.”); Kelvin K. F. Tsoi 
et al., Cognitive Tests to Detect Dementia: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 175 
JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1450, 1456–57 (2015) (“[T]he most common cutoff scores for the 
MMSE for dementia were 23 and 24 . . . .”). 
 463 See Tsoi et al., supra note 462, at 1456–57 (noting “considerable variation on the 
definitions of cutoff thresholds” among the MMSE and other cognitive exams). 
 464 See, e.g., id. at 1457 (“Although the MMSE is a proprietary instrument for dementia 
screening, the other screening tests are comparably effective but easier to perform and freely 
available.”). 
 465 See Rodríguez & Pareja, supra note 455, at 590 (advocating for changes to the 
existing MMSE in lieu of its retirement). 
 466 Id.  
 467 See Ziad S. Nasreddine et al., The Montreal Cognitive Assessment, MoCA: A Brief 
Screening Tool for Mild Cognitive Impairment, 53 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC’Y 695, 697 (2005) 
(detailing the items involved in the MoCA); David R. Roalf et al., Bridging Cognitive 
Screening Tests in Neurologic Disorders: A Crosswalk Between the Short Montreal 
Cognitive Assessment and Mini-Mental State Examination, 13 ALZHEIMER’S & 
DEMENTIA 947, 948 (2017) (“The MoCA overcomes some, but not all, of the limitations of 
the MMSE . . . .”). 
 468 Nasreddine et al., supra note 467, at 697. 
 469 See id. at 698 (describing the cut-off score of twenty-six for the MoCA as yielding 
the best balance between sensitivity and specificity). 
 470 Roalf et al., supra note 467, at 948.  
 471 See id. at 948. 
 472 Id.  
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Moreover, MoCA and MMSE scores are highly correlated, which allows the 
conversion of one score into the other to allow for direct comparison of 
cognitive performance through different screening tools.473 The usefulness of 
each tool relative to each other depends on the nature of the brain disturbance.474 
The MMSE and MoCA are not the only dementia screening tools 
available.475 A systematic review and meta-analysis of 149 studies that covered 
eleven different screening tests, including the MMSE and MoCA, found that 
many other tools, including the Mini-Cog test and the Addenbrooke’s Cognitive 
Examination-Revised, exhibit similar (sometimes better) rates of diagnostic 
accuracy for dementia than the MMSE.476 Furthermore, using multiple 
screening methods instead of just one is likely to significantly improve 
diagnostic accuracy.477 As such, researchers have been attempting to determine 
if certain combinations of assessment tools yield higher sensitivity and 
specificity.478  
The legal system is not unfamiliar with utilizing a battery of 
neuropsychological tests, as a number of different tests are being used together 
to determine cognitive faculties in former NFL players under the terms of the 
NFL Concussion Settlement.479  
                                                                                                                     
 473 Id. at 949. 
 474 See Arun Aggarwal & Emma Kean, Comparison of the Folstein Mini Mental State 
Examination (MMSE) to the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) as a Cognitive 
Screening Tool in an Inpatient Rehabilitation Setting, 1 NEUROSCIENCE & MED. 39, 41 
(2010) (“[Compared to the MoCA,] the MMSE does not perform well as a screening 
instrument for [MCI] . . . .”); YanHong Dong et al., The Montreal Cognitive Assessment 
(MoCA) Is Superior to the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE) for the Detection of 
Vascular Cognitive Impairment After Acute Stroke, 299 J. NEUROLOGICAL SCI. 15, 17 (2010) 
(discussing the “poorer performance of the MMSE at detecting [vascular cognitive 
impairment]”); Alex J. Mitchell & Srinivasa Malladi, Screening and Case Finding Tools for 
the Detection of Dementia. Part I: Evidence-Based Meta-Analysis of Multidomain Tests, 18 
AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 759, 760 (2010) (“[T]he MMSE seems to be a reasonably 
accurate method of detecting dementia . . . .”); Emad Salib & Justin McCarthy, Mental 
Alternation Test (MAT): A Rapid and Valid Screening Tool for Dementia in Primary 
Care, 17 INT’L J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 1157, 1160 (2002) (noting the difficulties in 
administrating the MMSE to visually impaired, deaf, or otherwise physically disabled 
individuals). 
 475 See Carnero-Pardo, supra note 461, at 477–78 (listing the basic characteristics of 
other “short cognitive tests” in addition to the MMSE and MoCA). For example, other short 
cognitive tests include the Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination (ACE), the Memory 
Impairment Screen (MIS), and the Seven Minute Screen (7MT). Id. at 478. 
 476 See Tsoi et al., supra note 462, at 1452, 1455 (finding similar or better specificity 
and sensitivity for both the ACE-R and Mini-Cog over the MMSE).  
 477 See Nasreddine et al., supra note 467, at 698 (suggesting a patient to first undergo 
the MoCA if they complain of cognitive impairment but show no functional impairment). 
 478 See, e.g., Harvan & Cotter, supra note 448, at 355 (noting higher sensitivities and 
specificities when the MMSE is combined with the Clock Drawing Test). Such attempts 
have produced mixed results. 
 479 See Amended Class Action Settlement Agreement, Exhibit A-2, In re Nat’l Football 
League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No. 14-cv-0029 (E.D. Penn. Feb. 13, 2015) 
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Additional tests that may be of potential use for judicial assessment include 
the following:480 
 Test of Premorbid Functioning (TOPF): The TOPF is a brief test 
estimating premorbid (i.e., before symptoms from the disease or 
disorder arise) cognitive and memory function.481 Participants are asked 
to pronounce phonetically irregular words, a process generally resistant 
to neurological decline.482  
 Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale IV (WAIS IV): The WAIS IV 
measures overall intellectual ability, assessing cognitive performance 
across four domains: verbal comprehension (verbal reasoning and 
communication); perceptual reasoning (fluid reasoning and perceptual 
organization); working memory (attention, concentration, and working 
memory), and processing speed (mental processing and efficient use of 
other cognitive abilities).483 Each domain is assessed using multiple 
subtests that measure additional processes, such as crystallized 
intelligence and cognitive flexibility.484  
 Wechsler Memory Scale IV (WMS IV): The WMS IV measures 
memory function using subtests assessing auditory memory, visual 
memory, and visual working memory.485 Each of these components of 
memory are assessed in immediate and delayed conditions.486  
                                                                                                                     
(setting forth the “Baseline Neuropsychological Test Battery” to which each qualified former 
NFL player is entitled). 
 480 This list is meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive. Additional tests to rule out 
response bias or poor effort might include the California Verbal Learning Test or the Validity 
Indicator Profile. See Sun et al., supra note 106. 
 481 PEARSON, TEST OF PREMORBID FUNCTIONING (TOPF) (2009), https://www.pearson 
clinical.com.au/products/view/596 [https://perma.cc/57BU-5DZC]. 
 482 James A. Holdnack et al., Predicting Premorbid Ability for WAIS–IV, WMS–IV and 
WASI–II, in WAIS-IV, WMS-IV, AND ACS: ADVANCED CLINICAL INTERPRETATION 217, 226 
(James A. Holdnack et al. eds., 2013). Performance on the reading task can be combined 
with various demographic factors (e.g., sex, race/ethnicity, education, developmental 
factors) to estimate premorbid intellectual function. Lisa Whipple Drozdick et al., Overview 
of the WAIS–IV/WMS–IV/ACS, in WAIS-IV, WMS-IV, AND ACS: ADVANCED CLINICAL 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 482, at 1, 55. Using the TOPF scores, clinicians can estimate 
expected performance on the WAIS IV and WMS IV to determine if the participant has 
experienced a decline. Id. 
 483 Drozdick et al., supra note 482, at 2. 
 484 Diane L. Coalson et al., WAIS-IV: Advances in the Assessment of Intelligence, in 
WAIS-IV CLINICAL USE AND INTERPRETATION 3, 7–8 (Lawrence G. Weiss et al. eds., 2010). 
For example, a subtest assessing working memory asks participants to recall a list of 
numbers, and a subtest assessing verbal comprehension provides participants with two 
concepts and asks them to describe how they are similar. Id. at 8. 
 485 James A. Holdnack & Lisa W. Drozdick, Using WAIS-IV with WMS-IV, in WAIS-
IV CLINICAL USE AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 484, at 237, 238. 
 486 Drozdick et al., supra note 482, at 20. This means that participants are presented with 
information or stimuli that they must reproduce immediately and then after a delay. Id. at 11. 
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 Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS): The D-KEFS 
measures executive functioning: the cognitive processes required to 
mentally assess ideas, resist temptations, and remain focused.487 The D-
KEFS subtests are standalone measures tapping into various facets of 
executive functioning, such as self-control, working memory, and 
cognitive flexibility.488 
o The Trail Making Test measures flexibility of thinking. Participants 
must draw a trail through letters and numbers.489 
o The Verbal Fluency Test measures fluency by asking participants 
to generate lists of words based on characteristics such as first letter 
(“F”) or category (“animals”).490 
o The Design Fluency Test measures problem-solving behavior, 
nonverbal productive and creativity, rule following, and visual-
perceptual speed.491 Participants draw novel patterns while abiding 
by specific rules.492 
o The Color-Word Interference Test measures inhibition.493 
Participants report the color of color words (e.g., “green”) written 
in another color (e.g., red ink).494 
o The Tower Test measures spatial planning, rule learning, and 
inhibition.495 Participants must, in the fewest possible moves, 
manipulate variably sized discs across pegs to an end spot 
designated by the examiner.496  
 Wisconsin Card Sorting Task: The Wisconsin Card Sorting Task is a 
measure of cognitive flexibility, a component of executive function.497 
                                                                                                                     
 487 Adele Diamond, Executive Functions, 64 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 135, 155 (2013). 
 488 Id. at 136. 
 489 Christopher R. Bowie & Philip D. Harvey, Administration and Interpretation of the 
Trail Making Test, 1 NATURE PROTOCOLS 2277, 2277 (2006). 
 490 See Susan Homack et al., Test Review: Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System, 27 
J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 599, 599–600 (2005). 
 491 See John L. Woodard et al., Interrater Reliability of Scoring Parameters for the 
Design Fluency Test, 6 NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 173, 173–74 (1992). 
 492 Id. 
 493 Arthur R. Jensen & William D. Rowher, Jr., The Stroop Color-Word Test: A 
Review, 25 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 36, 36–38 (1966). 
 494 Diamond, supra note 487, at 139. 
 495 In this context, the “Tower Test” refers to the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function 
System (D-KEFS), a test of executive functioning. See Anne-Claire Larochette et al., 
Executive Functioning: A Comparison of the Tower of LondonDX and the D-KEFS Tower 
Test, 16 APPLIED NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 275, 275–76 (2009) (“[Executive functioning] 
includes five general domains of functioning: fluency, planning, working memory, 
inhibition, and set shifting . . . . One of the most widely used tests of [executive functioning] 
is the Tower of London . . . . Recently, a new battery of tests called the [D-KEFS] was 
introduced, which included a new version of the tower test.” (citations omitted)). 
 496 Id. at 276. 
 497 See Diamond, supra note 487, at 149 (“Cognitive flexibility is often investigated 
using any of a wide array of task-switching and set-shifting tasks. The oldest of these is 
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Participants must deduce the correct sorting criteria for a deck of cards 
based solely on feedback of correct or incorrect from the examiner, 
switching their rules when the examiner indicates the criteria has 
changed.498 
 Booklet Category Test: The Booklet Category Test measures concept 
formation and abstraction.499 Participants must match various stimuli, 
such as letters, numbers or shapes, to possible responses during seven 
subtests.500 Participants are only provided with feedback of correct and 
incorrect.501 During each subtest, the rule is different, and participants 
must abstract each of the seven rules or concepts.502  
 California Verbal Learning Test (CVLT): The CVLT assesses verbal 
learning and memory.503 The examiner reads a list of nouns aloud, and 
participants must recall them immediately and then after a delay.504 
There is also an additional recognition phase available, which can be 
used as a test of the participant’s effort.505 
 Validity Indicator Profile: The Validity Indicator Profile was 
designed to detect malingered cognitive impairment.506 Participants 
must select one of two choices, with difficulty increasing throughout 
the test.507 Participants providing good effort would demonstrate 
decreasing performance over the test, while those providing variable 
                                                                                                                     
probably the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, one of the classic tests of prefrontal cortex 
function.” (citations omitted)). 
 498 Id. 
 499 Stanley R. Steindl & Gregory J. Boyle, Use of the Booklet Category Test to Assess 
Abstract Concept Formation in Schizophrenic Disorders, 10 CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 
205, 206 (1995) (citing Nick A. DeFilippis et al., Brief Report Development of a Booklet 
Form of the Category Test: Normative and Validity Data, 1 J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 339 (1979)). 
 500 DeFilippis et al., supra note 499, at 399. 
 501 Id. at 340. 
 502 Id. 
 503 See Richard W. Elwood, The California Verbal Learning Test: Psychometric 
Characteristics and Clinical Application, 5 NEUROPSYCHOLOGY REV. 173, 173 (1995) 
(“[This review] concludes that if the limitations of the CVLT are recognized, it can still make 
a useful contribution to the clinical assessment of verbal learning and memory.”). 
 504 Id. at 174. 
 505 See James C. Root et al., Detection of Inadequate Effort on the California Verbal 
Learning Test-Second Edition: Forced Choice Recognition and Critical Item Analysis, 12 J. 
INT’L NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL SOC’Y 688, 695 (2006) (“[Two measurement] indices, 
developed within the CVLT-II as brief screens of effort, exhibit strong predictive value in 
positive findings of inadequate effort.”). 
 506 Richard I. Frederick & Ross D. Crosby, Development and Validation of the Validity 
Indicator Profile, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 59, 61 (2000). 
 507 Id. 
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effort or malingering would not demonstrate a pattern of decreasing 
performance.508 
The bottom line for judicial screening is that no single tool will provide 
accurate assessment of judicial capacity, but also that the development of a 
judicial assessment tool should build on the extensive work in these areas. 
D. Emerging Neuroscientific Technologies 
The future of psychiatric medicine is increasingly moving toward the 
integration of biomarkers in diagnosis and treatment.509 In the area of dementia, 
new neuroimaging techniques are being developed to detect biomarkers for 
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) in its earliest stages.510 Such biomarkers can identify 
atrophying neural tissue in people with AD before they manifest observable 
behavioral changes.511 Because early detection is seen as so important, in 2004 
the Alzheimer’s Disease Neuroimaging Initiative (ADNI) was formed to 
develop a range of biomarkers—including imaging, genetic, and biochemical—
for the early detection and monitoring of AD.512 Moreover, these developments 
                                                                                                                     
 508 Id. 
 509 See Francis X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience 2.0, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1043, 1063 (2016) 
(“Psychiatrist Matthew Baum’s recent book on the neuroethics of biomarkers is an important 
contribution to this dialogue. Baum points out that ‘biomarker discovery and assembly into 
bio-actuarial tools are poised to proceed at an unprecedented pace.’”). 
 510 See STEVEN D. PEARSON ET AL., INST. FOR CLINICAL & ECON. REVIEW, DIAGNOSTIC 
TESTS FOR ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE: GENERATING AND EVALUATING EVIDENCE TO INFORM 
INSURANCE COVERAGE POLICY 43 (2012) (“[P]rospective cohort studies (e.g., Alzheimer’s 
Disease Neuroimaging Initiative) that have recruited convenience samples of patients are 
ongoing to evaluate the performance of multiple biomarkers . . . .”); Fiandaca et al., supra 
note 129, at 201 (“The capability of the neuroimaging modalities continues to improve, and 
their role in defining the preclinical state of AD is evolving.”); Risacher & Saykin, supra 
note 129, at 625 (describing neuroimaging as an “excellent noninvasive set of methods” for 
measuring AD progression). 
 511 Risacher & Saykin, supra note 129, at 625–26 (“Sensitive and specific biomarkers 
of AD are needed to detect patients in the early and preclinical stages of AD, to effectively 
monitor and predict disease progression, and to provide differential diagnostic information 
for an accurate diagnosis. . . . Neuroimaging [can] . . . measur[e] in vivo AD 
pathophysiology and brain atrophy associated with MCI and AD, as well as for predicting 
disease progression, even in patients with relatively minor or no cognitive impairments.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 512 Susanne G. Mueller et al., Ways Toward an Early Diagnosis in Alzheimer’s Disease: 
The Alzheimer’s Disease Neuroimaging Initiative (ADNI), 1 ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA 55, 
55 (2005); Michael W. Weiner et al., The Alzheimer’s Disease Neuroimaging Initiative: A 
Review of Papers Published Since Its Inception, 8 ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA 1, 2 (2012). 
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are no longer confined to research labs.513 In 2018, the Alzheimer’s Association 
called for the redefinition of AD based on biomarkers.514 
There are many legal and ethical questions that follow from the introduction 
of biomarkers.515 At present, brain biomarkers are not routinely used to diagnose 
psychiatric disorders.516 But some are optimistic about both present and near-
future abilities.517 Psychiatrist Matthew Baum similarly observes that 
“biomarker discovery and assembly into bio-actuarial tools are poised to 
proceed at an unprecedented pace.”518  
The implication of these trends for judicial screening is that the screening is 
likely to include neuroimaging. The screening tool should harness the 
potentially powerful information that brain data can provide but must also be 
carefully crafted to guard against inappropriate uses.519 Particularly challenging 
will be the cases where the neuroimaging diverges from the judge’s behavior. 
As my lab has explored elsewhere: “Is a neurological indicator of increased risk 
for [cognitive decline] a legally relevant brain state before there are outward 
behavioral manifestations [of that decline?]”520  
                                                                                                                     
 513 See Alzheimer’s Disease Redefined: New Research Framework Defines Alzheimer’s 
by Brain Changes, Not Symptoms, ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.alz 
.org/news/2018/alzheimer_s_disease_redefined_new_reseearch_frame [https://perma 
.cc/2L4J-N9JE] (summarizing a recent publication in its official research journal 
advocating for a redefinition of AD based on biomarkers). 
 514 Id. 
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NEUROSCIENCE 725, 725 (2007). 
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MEDICINE 55, 55 (Evian Gordon & Stephen H. Koslow eds., 2011) (“[R]ecent conceptual 
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 518 Matthew L. Baum, The Neuroethics of Biomarkers: What the Development of 
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in OXFORD SERIES IN NEUROSCIENCE, LAW, & PHILOSOPHY 1, 10–11 (Lynn Nadel et al. eds., 
2014). 
 519 For a discussion of possible inappropriate uses, see Owen D. Jones et al., Law and 
Neuroscience, 33 J. NEUROSCIENCE 17,624, 17,628–29 (2014) (raising the ethical issues of 
new techniques in neuroscience as they may be applied in legal settings). 
 520 Joshua Preston et al., The Legal Implications of Detecting Alzheimer’s Disease 
Earlier, 18 AMA J. ETHICS 1207, 1208 (2016). 
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E. The Neuroethics of Detecting Probabilistic Biomarkers in Judges 
The legal implications of using biomarkers to detect Alzheimer’s and other 
forms of dementia remain relatively unknown.521 It is therefore of paramount 
importance to map out the ethical, legal, and social implications of collecting 
brain data from judges. Most bodies of law—including tort, contracts, and 
criminal law—have traditionally demanded outwardly manifested behavior as a 
prerequisite for legal recognition of physical injury.522 The advent of AD 
biomarkers thus poses a conundrum: How should the law treat a person who 
does not exhibit behavioral symptoms but whose brain is documented to have 
already changed in such a way as to suggest a higher likelihood of AD? In the 
language of the National Institutes of Aging research framework, how will we 
treat someone who is in the pre-symptomatic phase, wherein they are on the 
Alzheimer’s continuum but still symptom free?523 The question might be 
particularly difficult at the time of judicial confirmation. 
While the full legal implications of AD biomarkers are under-explored in 
the literature, what is clear is that they pose unique ethical issues for clinicians 
and researchers. The current nondiscrimination legal landscape does not 
accommodate individuals with these biomarkers.524 
Historically, the disclosure of a patient’s AD diagnosis has posed a 
pervasive ethical challenge for clinicians.525 The asymptomatic and non-
treatable nature of AD biomarkers complicates this further, and clinicians need 
to consider the benefits, risks, and limitations of disclosing amyloid 
neuroimaging results to the judicial nominee (and to the judicial nominating 
committee) when the nominee is otherwise cognitively normal.526 This will not 
                                                                                                                     
 521 See id. at 1207 (noting that there is little research on the legal issues surrounding the 
use of biomarkers as a detection method for AD). 
 522 See Francis X. Shen, Mind, Body, and the Criminal Law, 97 MINN. L. REV. 2036, 
2044 (2013) (“In a variety of criminal and quasi-criminal contexts, . . . legislative line 
drawing between criminal and non-criminal behavior invokes the concept of ‘bodily’ (or 
‘physical’) injury.”). 
 523 Clifford R. Jack, Jr. et al., Hypothetical Model of Dynamic Biomarkers of the 
Alzheimer’s Pathological Cascade, 9 LANCET NEUROLOGY 119 (2010) (“The clinical disease 
stages of AD have been divided into three phases. First is a pre-symptomatic phase in which 
individuals are cognitively normal but some have AD pathological changes.”). 
 524 Jalayne J. Arias et al., The Proactive Patient: Long-Term Care Insurance 
Discrimination Risks of Alzheimer’s Disease Biomarkers, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 485, 485 
(2018). 
 525 See generally S. Gauthier et al., Diagnosis and Management of Alzheimer’s Disease: 
Past, Present and Future Ethical Issues, 110 PROGRESS NEUROBIOLOGY 102 (2013). 
 526 J. Scott Roberts et al., Presentation on Assessing the Impact of Disclosing Amyloid 
Imaging Results to Cognitively Normal Older Adults: The Reveal-Scan Study (July 19, 
2017) (on file with Ohio State Law Journal) (assessing ethical issues in revealing 
Alzheimer’s disease biomarkers to asymptomatic adults); see also Howard M. Fillit, We 
Need New Biomarkers for Alzheimer’s Disease, SCI. AM. (Sept. 21, 2018), https://blogs 
.scientificamerican.com/observations/we-need-new-biomarkers-for-alzheimers-disease/ 
[https://perma.cc/9PQE-MZ6S] (stating that Alzheimer’s disease is currently untreatable). 
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only require clinicians to prepare new counseling aids but also to reconsider the 
risks subjects face in neuroimaging research and how they seek informed 
consent.527 States and the federal government will also have to revisit the 
medical disclosure waivers they require nominees to sign.528 
Additional consideration needs to be placed on the impact this information 
can have on judges and their family members.529 Despite the lack of treatment 
options, stakeholders report the benefit of clinical management of the disease, 
making lifestyle changes, and preparing for eventual cognitive impairment.530 
Even so, studies report fears of social harm, such as stigmatization, adverse life 
decisions, and psychological harm.531  
Despite the presence of nondiscrimination laws like the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
(GINA), and others, these legal frameworks do not address asymptomatic health 
information like AD biomarkers.532 One fifty-state survey of nondiscrimination 
laws found that many emphasized “genetic information,” which by definition 
amyloid and tau biomarkers are not.533 Another fifty-state survey found that 
only half of all states have long-term care insurance regulations that prohibit 
discrimination based on pre-existing conditions.534 Forty-three states do not 
prohibit long-term care insurers from using health information in their 
underwriting decisions, which makes these laws inadequate in “protect[ing] 
individuals from discrimination based on biomarker status in the context of 
[long-term care] insurance.”535 Such a “failure to address and mitigate 
discrimination risks will prevent individuals who are biomarker positive from 
accessing critical resources to prepare for financial burden of [long-term service 
and support] costs.”536  
                                                                                                                     
 527 See Roberts et al., supra note 526; see also Julio C. Rojas et al., Presentation on 
Uncertainties and Ethical Considerations for Decision-Making Regarding Amyloid-Related 
Imaging Abnormalities in Clinical Trials for Alzheimer’s Disease (July 19, 2017) (on file 
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 528 See, e.g., DEL. COURTS, supra note 432. 
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Alzheimer’s Disease, 26 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 297, 301–02 (2015). 
 530 Id. at 300. 
 531 See id. at 301 (noting reported adverse life decisions and psychological harm from 
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 532 Arias et al., supra note 524, at 485. 
 533 See Arias, supra note 531. 
 534 See Arias et al., supra note 524, at 495. 
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If the legal system were to introduce a system in which judges were required 
to obtain brain scans, it could place the judge in an ethical quandary: If she has 
no symptoms, but the brain scan reveals the progression of neuropathology, 
must she report it to the chief judge?537 To the insurance company?538 How will 
return of results be developed?539 
Moreover, careful attention must be paid to diseases other than AD. While 
much of the literature focuses on AD,540 it is only one of many forms of 
dementia, including dementia with Lewy bodies, vascular dementia, and 
frontotemporal dementia.541 There are considerable—and under-explored—
implications of early AD detection for estate law, end-of-life care, and family 
law.542 This Article has focused primarily on the implications of judicial brain 
health for the legal system. But the judge must also be recognized as a patient.  
VII. DISCUSSION 
This Part discusses several possible implications of, and extensions to, the 
system proposed in Part V. I discuss (A) constitutionality, (B) feasibility, and 
(C) legitimacy. 
                                                                                                                     
 537 See FAQs: Filing a Judicial Complaint or Disability Complaint Against a Federal 
Judge, U.S. CTS. (June 2016), https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-
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Responds to the Loss of Absolute Immunity?, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 267 (1990) 
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 539 See generally Jalayne J. Arias & Jason Karlawish, Confidentiality in Preclinical 
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pathology). 
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 541 Other Dementias, ALZHEIMER SOC’Y CAN., https://alzheimer.ca/en/Home/About-
dementia/Dementias?gclid=Cj0KCQiA04XxBRD5ARIsAGFygj8x06t70alM-Iotxaxca 
gWsf_Oa97p8-y7wpXvpWFB67HZchHcqdzQaAp28EALw_wcB [https://perma.cc/C5 
4L-YBDD] (last updated Nov. 8, 2017). 
 542 For example, the possibility that an individual may have a probabilistic risk for 
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determinations. See generally Jalayne J. Arias, A Time to Step In: Legal Mechanisms for 
Protecting Those with Declining Capacity, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 134 (2013) (presenting a 
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while highlighting the gap of legal protections for those within the competency-
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A. Constitutional Implications 
Debates over the proper balance of congressional oversight and judicial 
independence with regard to removal of judges are extensive.543 There is 
scholarly debate about the extent to which the Constitution permits anything 
other than impeachment as a permissible means of judicial discipline.544 Further 
analysis beyond the discussion here is warranted, but to guide that analysis, I 
offer the following observations. 
In relevant part, the Constitution reads:  
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold 
their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for 
their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their 
Continuance in Office.545  
As others have observed, “the Constitution contains few requirements 
regarding the structure of the federal courts,” and “[a]lthough Article III 
provides for a Supreme Court headed by the Chief Justice of the United States, 
nothing else about its structure and its operation is specified, so the size and 
composition of the Court is left to Congress.”546 
The constitutionality of my proposal depends on where it falls along two 
dimensions: (1) Is it required or just recommended? and (2) Will the data 
collected remain purely private, or will the data be discoverable and actionable?  
Under my proposal, the judge would not have to share their data with 
anyone. They might be strongly encouraged to share their data with the Chief 
Judge under certain conditions, but they could not be compelled to do so. This 
is not to say that there are not constitutional concerns that need further 
attention—it is simply to point out that the system can be designed in ways that 
are less (or more) offensive to judicial independence.  
There is also a state-level constitutional question of a different sort: Would 
the introduction of individual-level judicial cognitive assessment tools lead to 
                                                                                                                     
 543 Michael D. Gilbert, Judicial Independence and Social Welfare, 112 MICH. L. REV. 
575, 577 (2014) (“Judicial independence is a cornerstone of American constitutionalism, and 
it has long been a source of controversy.”). For a bibliography on point, see Amy B. Atchison 
et al., Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability: A Selected Bibliography, 72 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 723, 750–62 (1999). 
 544 Peter M. Shane, Who May Discipline or Remove Federal Judges? A Constitutional 
Analysis, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 209, 223 (1993) (“A number of commentators assert that the 
arguments demonstrating the exclusivity of impeachment as a political device for judicial 
discipline exclude any possibility of judicial discipline through judiciary-dependent devices 
such as prosecution or judicial self-regulation.”). 
 545 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 546 ELIZABETH B. BAZAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31340, CONGRESSIONAL 
AUTHORITY OVER THE FEDERAL COURTS 2 (2005). 
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the conclusion that, even under a rational basis test, state mandatory judicial 
retirement ages are a violation of the Equal Protection Clause?547  
Additional analysis would be required, but in brief, it is interesting to 
consider that Judge Theile (the Michigan judge who in 2018 challenged the 
Michigan judicial retirement age statute on Equal Protection grounds) argued 
that the law should not survive a rational basis test because rational, 
nondiscriminatory options are available: “Legislature, judicial tenure 
commission and/or the Michigan Supreme Court can make laws, rules or 
administrative orders requiring judges and judicial candidates to pass certain 
mental and physical capability tests. The Michigan State Court Administrator 
could develop performance evaluations similar to those in the private sector.”548 
Theile’s excellent argument anticipated the proposal made in this Article.  
B. Feasibility 
A judicial capacity screening tool sounds appealing in theory. But to move 
from theory to an actual toolbox requires a lot of work and the resolution of 
many difficult challenges. Beyond the scope of the Article, but necessary too, 
would be consideration of the layers of politics surrounding judicial regulation. 
The politics are so problematic that one scholar of judicial mandatory retirement 
is resigned to the fact that no reform will ever happen:  
[T]he . . . likely course is that five decades hence, some future scholar will 
[add] . . . another half-dozen mentally decrepit justices to the sad and poignant 
roster our history already offers of jurists who harmed their Court and hurt their 
own reputations by remaining on the bench too long.549  
Must we resign ourselves to such a dismal future? 
The political feasibility rests on a decoupling of assessments of cognitive 
capacity from political impetus to shape the courts based on ideology. Such 
decoupling should happen under my proposal, given the emphasis on complete 
privacy for the medical records. Moreover, the mandated assessments could be 
implemented only for new judges with current judges having the option to opt 
in or not. This would alleviate the concern that whichever political party has 
power when the program is implemented would gain a large number of new 
judgeships. 
To be sure, ensuring complete privacy—without even judicial councils or 
chief judges aware of individual judge capacity assessments—ultimately relies 
upon the judge themselves to make an appropriate decision about when to 
                                                                                                                     
 547 See generally Nina A. Kohn, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Age Discrimination: 
A Challenge to a Decades-Old Consensus, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 213 (2010) (detailing 
debates among courts regarding whether age discrimination is covered under rational basis 
review). 
 548 “Corrected” Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 343, at *28–29.  
 549 Garrow, supra note 245, at 1087. 
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retire.550 That is, under my proposed system, even if a doctor recommends that 
a judge retire due to cognitive impairment, the judge could ignore that advice. 
It is an untested assumption, but I believe a plausible one, that judges will do 
the right thing if those judges are provided regular cognitive assessment data. 
I am optimistic that, despite the many acknowledged challenges, there is a 
path forward for the successful development of a judicial capacity assessment 
toolbox. It would surely require a working group to carefully review relevant 
findings in law, medicine, and science. But such committees are organized 
regularly, and funding might be available from a variety of sources.551 
There is already momentum in the policy sphere. In September 2018, 
Representative Darrell Issa (R-OH) proposed the Judiciary Reforms, 
Organization and Operational Modernization Act of 2018.552 In the Act, Rep. 
Issa proposed regular medical exams for all federal judges: 
SEC. 203. MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS FOR FEDERAL JUDGES. 
(a) IN GENERAL. Chapter 21 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by 
adding at the end the following: 
§ 464. Medical examinations for justices and judges 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Each justice or judge of the United States shall, at no 
expense to the judge or justice, undergo a medical examination by a 
physician— 
(1) in the case of a judge or justice who is 70 years of age or younger, 
every 5 years; 
(2) in the case of a judge or justice who is older than 70 years of age and 
younger than 81 years of age, every 2 years; and 
(3) in the case of a judge or justice who is 81 years of age or older, every 
year. 
(b) CONFIDENTIALITY.—Except as provided in subsection (c), the results of a 
medical examination described in subsection (a) shall be confidential. 
(c) EXCEPTION.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in the case that 
a physician conducting a medical examination described in subsection (a) 
identifies a condition that may impact the ability of the judge or justice to 
carry out the duties of judge or justice’s position, the physician shall 
submit such finding to the appropriate chief judge or justice. In the case 
that the condition described in the previous sentence relates to a chief 
                                                                                                                     
 550 See Mark Sherman, Federal Judges Have a Way to Make Investigations Disappear, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 10, 2019), https://apnews.com/c593d922bf264cb683ff89a87 
aad5a14 [https://perma.cc/9QU7-YVZV] (highlighting that investigations into judicial 
conduct disappear with retirement). 
 551 E.g., James C. Duff, The Federal Judiciary Workplace Conduct Working Group, AM. 
B. ASS’N (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/publications/judges 
_journal/2018/fall/the-federal-judiciary-workplace-conduct-working-group/ [https://per 
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 552 H.R. 6755, 115th Cong. (2018). 
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judge, the physician shall submit the finding to the chief judge of the court 
with appellate jurisdiction over the court on which the judge sits.553 
Rep. Issa’s bill, although it did not advance out of the Committee on the 
Judiciary,554 is indicative of congressional interest in pursuing new solutions for 
screening older judges. My primary critiques of the bill are that it provides no 
definition of “medical examination,” does not collect baseline data at 
nomination, and is too vague in section 3(c) as to when a physician must submit 
his health findings.555 The ambiguity is in the phrase “a condition that may 
impact the ability of the judge.”556 There is no timeline suggested, e.g., may 
impact ability in the next month, the next five years, etc.557 But, critiques aside, 
the fact that congressional time is already being spent on this issue speaks to its 
importance. 
At the state level, there is activity of a different sort suggesting there would 
be interest in this toolbox. Many states already offer Lawyer and Judge 
Assistance Programs through their state bar associations.558 These programs 
often offer confidential support regarding personal problems like substance 
abuse and/or mental health.559 Such programs are in place in Arizona,560 
Hawaii,561 Indiana,562 Louisiana,563 Michigan,564 Mississippi,565 New 
                                                                                                                     
 553 Id. § 203 (emphasis in original). 
 554 See Bills in the 115th Congress: H.R. 6755, C-SPAN, https://www.c-span.org/ 
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 565 Lawyers & Judges Assistance Program, MISS. B., https://www.msbar.org/ 
programs-affiliates/lawyers-judges-assistance-program.aspx [https://perma.cc/VA7Y 
-V3QE]. 
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Jersey,566 New Mexico,567 New York,568 and Pennsylvania.569 Notably, the 
Louisiana Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program specifically mentions aging 
and age-related dementia as an impairment that judges and lawyers should 
consider.570 The Program aims to “reach the aging lawyer before their condition 
becomes a discipline issue[.]”571 The State Bar of Michigan also provides 
resources related to aging on their website,572 as does Indiana573 and 
Arkansas.574 Although most of these programs focus at present only on aging 
lawyers, they provide a foundation on which to reach out to judges as well.575  
One Pennsylvania program, a judge-specific subset of Lawyers Concerned 
for Lawyers (aptly called Judges Concerned for Judges, JCJ), provides 
confidential support and resources for judges struggling with a variety of 
ailments, but mostly focuses on mental disorders (anxiety, bipolar disorder, 
depression, eating disorders) and addiction (drugs, alcohol, gambling).576 JCJ 
offers a “peer assistance program” to “restore the health and professional 
competence” of judges through “confidential helpline services, volunteer 
support and education.”577 JCJ offers education, referral to a medical provider 
for a consultation, personalized treatment plans, and peer support for judges who 
seek their assistance.578 A legal culture that already recognizes the need for 
improved mental health should be open to a conversation about the toolbox I 
propose in this Article. 
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C. Legitimacy  
A system of aging judges raises not only substantive concerns but concerns 
about perception as well. Amidst concerns about judges’ brain health, it could 
be the case that the public will be reassured knowing that judges undergo regular 
brain health checkups. In a separate set of studies, I have started to pilot some 
empirical work to test this proposition.579  
I ran experiments looking at public confidence in the functional capacity of 
(1) a judge and (2) a law professor at ages fifty-two, sixty-two, seventy-two, 
eighty-two, ninety-two, and one-hundred and two. I also examined how the 
introduction of cognitive health data affects subjects’ legitimacy ratings. The 
bottom line of the results are: (1) the public is slightly more confident in older 
academics than they are in older judges, but; (2) even at baseline for judges there 
is great confidence in seventy-five-year-old judges, and; (3) for judges and 
academics, healthy cognitive testing leads to high levels of confidence 
regardless of age. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
America is getting older, and so too are its judges. At present, most 
commentators on the topic of aging judges have expressed concern and made 
proposals for mandatory retirement or term limits. This Article has advocated 
for a different approach: empowering aging judges through the implementation 
of private, individual cognitive health assessments. If carefully developed 
through interdisciplinary collaboration, advances in the neuroscience of aging 
and dementia can provide to our nation’s judges actionable information about 
their brain health. System-wide data collection as proposed here will require 
careful study and design before implementation, but it has the transformative 
potential to improve the efficiency and legitimacy of the judicial branch. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 579 Data and preliminary studies on file with author. 
